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UNLEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION MEANS BY "DECLARE WAR"
Saikrishna Prakasht
Does Congress's power to "declare war" extend beyond the ability to issue
formal declarations of war and include the power to decide whether the
United States will wage war? Relatedly, does the "declare war" power sub-
sume the authority to decide whether the United States will wage war even
when another nation already has declared war on the United States? Using
a host of overlooked historical materials, this Article answers both questions
in the affirmative. In the eighteenth century, the power to declare war was a
power to decide whether a nation would wage war, and any decision to wage
war, however expressed, was a declaration of war. While the commencement
of warfare was the strongest declaration of war because it unmistakably sig-
naled a decision to wage war, other words and deeds could likewise constitute
a declaration of war. The Constitution grants the "declare war" power to
Congress only, and hence only Congress can decide whether the United States
will start a war or wage war against a nation that already has declared war
against the United States. Under the original Constitution, the President
cannot make these fateful choices.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing to James Madison in 1789, ThomasJefferson extolled the
Constitution for providing "one effectual check to the Dog of war by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body."' Evidently, Jefferson had concluded that the Con-
stitution's grant of power "[t]o declare war"2 meant that Congress,
and not the President, would decide when the nation would wage war.
Some scholars argue that Jefferson's reading of "declare war" was
spectacularly mistaken, at least as a matter of the Constitution's origi-
nal meaning.3 They believe that the President, as Commander in
I Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMASJEFFERsON 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (endnote omitted). Jefferson was
likely drawing from William Shakespeare. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3,
sc. 1, line 273 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale Univ. Press 2006), available at http://shake-
speare.mit.edu/julius.caesar/full.html (Marc Antony proclaiming, "Cry 'Havoc,' and let
slip the dogs of war").
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare
War....").
3 See, e.g., ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 109-10
(1991); JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 7-11 (2005); Henry P. Monaghan,
Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 19 passim (1970); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases
Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REv. 833, 848-57 (1972);John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167, 173-74 (1996) (arguing that the President may start a war).
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Chief,4 certainly could let slip the dogs of war. The President had
merely to order the Army to invade another nation or the Navy to
attack another nation's ships to unchain fully the war dogs. On this
view, the congressional power to "declare war" poses no barrier to the
President's starting a war. Congress merely has the power to issue for-
mal declarations of war, determining whether wartime statutes will
come into play. 5 So while the President could take the nation to war,
only Congress could decide that certain wartime powers and limita-
tions will apply. This "formalist theory" of the "declare war" power
supposes that congressional declarations of war were always formal
documents of marginal significance. 6
Other scholars regard Jefferson as only partially mistaken.7 They
argue that only Congress can take the nation from a state of peace
into a state of war.8 Hence, consistent with the grant of the "declare
war" power to Congress, the President cannot order the Air Force to
launch a first strike on Pyongyang. Such an order would be contrary
to the constitutional allocation of the "declare war" power to Congress
because the very act of bombing the North Korean capital would itself
be an informal declaration of war. Bombing would be no less a decla-
ration of war than if the President had uttered the words "I declare
war on North Korea." Yet, if North Korea declared war against the
United States first, the President could order the military to wage war
against North Korea without securing a prior congressional declara-
tion of war. The President could order a blockade, a ground invasion,
even a nuclear strike. Why? Because North Korea, through its decla-
ration of war, would have thrust the United States into an unavoidable
war. This "pragmatic theory" supposes that the "declare war" power
was irrelevant in this situation because nations could not declare war
in response to other nations who have already declared war.9
4 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States ... .
5 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 244-46.
6 See id. at 247. I call this theory the "formalist theory" not as a pejorative but merely
because the theory stresses that the "declare war" power only enables Congress to issue
formal declarations of war. As "formalism" or "formalist" are ordinarily used, all three
theories discussed here-the formalist, pragmatic, and categorical theories-offer formal-
ist accounts of "declare war" because each is a theory that takes text, structure, and history
seriously.
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 239-45
(2007) (arguing that President can wage war in response to another nation's declaration of
war); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1543, 1549-50
(2002).
8 See Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1546.
9 Some scholars insist that only Congress can decide that the nation will wage war
but do not focus on the situation when another nation has declared war first on the United
States. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 80-84 (1990); HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 74-77 (1990); W. TAYLOR REVELEY
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"(T]here is nothing to 'declare'-the state of war already exists." ' If
the "declare war" power is immaterial because the United States is at
war, Congress has no ex ante check on going to war, and the Presi-
dent may prosecute the war without constraint, or so the pragmatic
theory maintains.
Thomas Jefferson was not mistaken on the meaning of "declare
war"-only Congress has the power to decide when the nation will
wage war. Using untapped eighteenth-century materials, this Article
answers two questions about the original meaning of "declare war."
First, did the power to declare war extend beyond the ability to issue
formal declarations of war to include the authority to determine
whether a nation would wage a war? Second, did the power to declare
war encompass the authority to decide whether a nation would wage
war even in those situations where another nation had already de-
clared war?"
This Article answers both questions in the affirmative. While the
ability to issue formal declarations of war certainly was part of the "de-
clare war" power, that power extended beyond the mere issuance of
formal declarations. Any decision to wage war, however expressed,
was a declaration of war. Contrary to what some might imagine, there
were no prescribed words or phrases that governments needed to ut-
ter in order to declare war. Many words and actions looking nothing
like a formal declaration of war were declarations of war nonetheless.
Indeed, it was far more common for nations in the eighteenth century
to declare war via informal means than by a formal declaration.
The most forceful and unambiguous declaration of war was the
commencement of general hostilities. In the mid-eighteenth century,
Sir Robert Walpole, commonly regarded as the first English Prime
Minister, observed
that of late most Wars have been declar'd from the Mouths of Can-
nons, before any formal Declaration; and, Sir, it is very probable,
III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE
BRANCH? 55-115 (1981); Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29,
39-47 (1972); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 677-88 (1972); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and
the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REx'. 695, 740-56 (1997).
Other scholars have argued that Congress must make all decisions relating to whether
the nation will wage war. SeeJOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-9 (1993); Louis
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 3-12 (2d ed. 2004); FRANCIS D. NORMUTH & EDWIN B.
FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 72-75 (2d ed. 1986).
10 RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 241.
1 I A companion essay discusses other questions related to declarations of war. In par-
ticular, it considers all of the functions that a declaration of war played in the eighteenth
century, what Congress must do to declare war, and whether proposed declarations of war
are subject to the Presentment Clause. See Saikrishna Prakash, Declarations of War: A Pri-
mer (Sept. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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that if we are obliged to come to an open Rupture with Spain, our
first Declaration of War made on our Parts will be from the Mouth
of our Cannon. 12
Or consider what John Adams wrote during the Revolutionary War.
He opined that the war between England and France was "sufficiently
declared by actual hostilities in most parts of the world."' 3 A little
later, a French statesman noted that "hostilities are commonly consid-
ered as the strongest declaration of war."' 4 Nations also regarded a
number of hostile actions short of general warfare as declarations of
war. Among other things, making an alliance with a nation at war was
a declaration of war against that nation's foes.
15
The "declare war" power also encompassed the ability to deter-
mine whether and how to wage war in response to another nation's
declaration of war. Even after another nation had declared war, the
targeted nation had a decision and a possible declaration to make be-
cause war was not always an obvious response. An entity with the
power to declare war on behalf of Prussia could decide to wage war
against a nation that had declared war against Prussia. Alternatively,
that entity might decline to declare war, thereby limiting the Prussian
military to defensive measures. At the extreme, Prussia might decide
to sue for peace. Accordingly, an entity empowered to declare war
could decide when and under what circumstances a nation would
wage a war.
This "categorical theory" regards the "declare war" power as the
power to control all decisions to enter into a war. The "declare war"
power included the power to start a war-to issue declarations that
start a war, termed here "initiation declarations."' 16 The "declare war"
power also encompassed the authority to enter a war against a nation
that had already declared war-to issue declarations in response to
another nation's initiation declaration, termed here "response decla-
12 The Second Parliament of George 1I: Fourth Session (9 of 9), Begins 12/5/1738,
10 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, http://www.british-his-
tory.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37805 (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
13 Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (Feb. 14, 1779), in 3 THE REVOLUTION-
ARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 47, 48 (Francis Wharton ed.,
Wash. Gov't Prtg. Office 1889) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPON-
DENCE]. He added, "I suspect there will never be any other declaration of war. Yet there is
in fact as complete a war as ever existed." Id.
14 1 JACQUES NECKER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN
GREAT STATES 273 (London, G.G.J. &J. Robinson 1792).
15 See infta text accompanying notes 117-27.
16 See TRcAVERS Twiss, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES 60-62 (2d ed., London, Longman's, Green & Co. 1875) (noting that declara-
tion of war serves the function of commencing war and noting instances when formal
declaration actually served that purpose).
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rations."' 7 Finally, the "declare war" power subsumed the ability to
decide what level of hostilities a nation will bring to bear in a war.
Someone with the power to declare war may declare a limited land or
naval war' 8 or may declare an all-out general war.
In the context of the Constitution, the grant of "declare war"
power means that only Congress can decide whether the United States
will wage war. The President cannot make this crucial decision be-
cause the Constitution never grants the Commander in Chief the
power to declare war. Accordingly, the President cannot unilaterally
order an airstrike on Tehran because such an attack would amount to
a declaration of war. Moreover, even if Iran declared war on the
United States, either formally or informally, the President could not
attack Iran merely because the latter had already declared war. The
decision whether to go to war always rests with Congress. Finally, as
part of its authority to declare war, Congress may choose what type of
war to fight. Congress may authorize a general war-land, sea, and
air-against an enemy. Or Congress may authorize only limited of-
fensive measures, such as a sea war only.' 9 And Congress might
choose not to declare war at all and instead urge the Executive to
negotiate a settlement, leaving the Executive to order defensive mea-
sures coupled with treaty talks. 20 In sum, under the Constitution, the
decision to wage war, and the type of war to be fought, rests with Con-
gress, creating what we might call a "unitary war power."
Early Commanders in Chief well understood that the Constitu-
tion did not permit them to wage war unilaterally. In fact, these Presi-
dents believed that they could not wage war even in response to
another nation's declaration of war. Though two Indian nations de-
clared war on the United States, President George Washington con-
sistently maintained that Congress had to authorize offensive
measures against these nations. "The constitution vests the power of
declaring war in Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of im-
17 See, e.g., Act of April 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 1, 1 ("Resolved ... That the state of war
between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust
upon the United States is hereby formally declared .... ").
18 For example, in 1799, Congress authorized a limited naval war with France. See,
e.g., Non-Intercourse Act, 1 Stat. 613, ch. 2, § 1 (1799).
19 See, e.g., id. § 5 (allowing naval officers to stop and seize American ships bound for
French ports during the naval war with France); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170,
173, 177 (1804) (discussing the United States' limited naval war with France).
20 As discussed in Part 1II, early Presidents understood that they could not order a
general war against even those nations that had declared war against the United States.
Instead, early Presidents distinguished between offensive and defensive measures. While
the President might authorize defensive measures designed to thwart attacks and repel
invasions, only Congress could authorize offensive measures meant to take the fight to the
enemy. These Presidents believed that only the Congress could authorize offensive mea-
sures because only Congress had the power to take the nation to war. See discussion infra
Parts II.B.4, III.A.2.
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portance can be undertaken" against the "refractory part of the Creek
nation ... until after [Congress] shall have deliberated upon the sub-
ject, and authorized such a measure," 21 he observed. Presidents John
Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison hewed to this line as
well. 22 Across these administrations, nations (France, Tripoli, En-
gland, Algeria) declared war on the United States, formally and infor-
mally, and in each instance, the sitting President went to Congress for
authority to wage war. No early President felt free to wage war merely
because another nation had declared war on the United States. Each
understood that to wage war was to declare it, a power the Constitu-
tion granted Congress and not the President.
Part I of this Article considers constitutional text and structure.
Part II, using seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth-century
historical materials, argues that the power to declare war included the
power to issue initiation declarations. Drawing upon the same set of
materials, Part III contends that the power to declare war included the
authority to decide whether and how to wage war in response to an-
other nation's declaration of war, i.e., included the power to issue re-
sponse declarations. Part IV considers some implications of the
original meaning of "declare war."2-3
Rather than merely relying upon familiar originalist sources, this
Article unearths the original meaning of "declare war" by tapping new
sources. First, it examines actual declarations of war that nations is-
sued in the eighteenth century. Second, it considers what a broad
spectrum of Europeans said about declaring war-not just those writ-
ers devoted to international law, but monarchs, legislators, ministers,
and historians of the era. Third, it sheds light on American treaties
which contained provisions dependent on the existence of a declara-
tion of war. Fourth, the Article recounts diplomatic letters written
during America's Revolutionary War. Finally, the Article considers
documents from early administrations in which executive officers, in-
21 Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 366, 367 (Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1855), available at http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit
(gw330067)).
22 See infra Part III.A.2.
23 Some caveats are in order. This Article never argues that the original Constitution
(and its meanings) ought to apply today. Instead, the Article makes claims about the late
eighteenth-century meaning of "declare war" and assumes that this meaning should con-
tinue to apply today. Given the central role that originalist arguments have played in war
powers scholarship, the peculiar relevance of the original meaning of the Constitution in
this area is perhaps obvious. Moreover, this Article does not discuss whether the United
States properly declared various wars. That would require an examination of the events
leading up to these wars, an inquiry well outside this Article's scope. Finally, this Article
does not address whether there should be judicial review over whether the political
branches properly declared war.
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cluding Presidents, endorsed the idea that the Constitution created a
unitary war power vested with Congress.
Current events suggest that this is an opportune time to recon-
sider the meaning of "declare war." The Bush Administration main-
tains that the Constitution empowers the President to start a war.
24
Although the Administration secured congressional approval for the
Afghani and Iraqi wars,25 it may yet wage war on another nation with-
out first securing such approval. Indeed, Washington buzzes with
speculation about whether the President will order a military strike on
Iran.2 6 One reason for such a strike might be the alleged Iranian assis-
tance to Iraqi Shia militias, 27 assistance that could be seen as an infor-
mal Iranian declaration of war against the United States. An attack on
Iran made without congressional approval would trigger a firestorm
precisely because of profound disagreement about what it means to
"declare war."
I
THE CATEGORICAL THEORY OF "DECLARE WAR"
While the ultimate objective of this Article is to establish what
"declare war" and "declaration of war" meant in the late eighteenth
century, this Part does not attempt to establish those definitions. It
has more modest objectives: (1) to introduce (without substantiating)
the categorical theory of declare war, namely the idea that the power
to declare war encompassed the power to decide to wage war; (2) to
establish that nothing in the Constitution precludes such a meaning;
and (3) to argue that as a matter of structure, the formalist and prag-
matic theories of "declare war" lead to incongruous and improbable
allocations of war powers.
A. The Decision to Wage War as a Declaration of War
In the eighteenth century an entity with the power to declare war
could issue declarations of war. Although declarations of war could
serve many functions, the principal function was to announce that a
nation had chosen to wage war against another nation. Among other
24 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the President,
The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists
and Nations Supporting Them, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (last visited
Aug. 25, 2007) (concluding that because "[d]eclaring war is not tantamount to making
war," the President may wage war notwithstanding the Constitution's grant of "declare war"
authority to Congress).
25 Cf Christopher Shea, War Counse BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2005, at El.
26 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Dafna Linzer & Thomas E. Ricks, US. Is Studying Military Strike
Options on Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2006, at Al.
27 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Iran Readies Military, Fearing a U.S. Attack, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 21, 2005, at Al.
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things, declarations notified the enemy, the declaring party's own na-
tionals,2 8 and the rest of the world 29 that one nation had decided to
wage war on another."'
In ancient times, heralds sent to the enemy made these declara-
tions."' Later declarations were written and delivered to the enemy
prior to the beginning of hostilities.3 2 By the eighteenth century, na-
tions had almost wholly abandoned the practice of giving warning of
impending warfare43 and the practice of issuing formal declarations
waned, although it did not disappear entirely.3 4
Nonetheless, as shown in Part II, declarations of war continued to
be associated with the onset of war. In particular, it became common
to regard as a declaration of war any words or actions that signaled
that a nation had decided to wage war. These signals could be formal
or informal. Formal declarations usually would contain a statement
like "we declare war on France" or "we declare that a state of war exists
with Holland." Such formal declarations remain familiar to this day.
Indeed, if such words are not uttered or written in a war, many are
likely to regard the war as an "undeclared war."
Yet "declare war" was not understood so narrowly in the eight-
eenth century. Although one could say that wars without formal dec-
larations were "undeclared wars," one equally could say that some
declaration of war, be it formal or informal, always coincided with or
preceded the commencement of warfare. In other words, even if
there were no formal declaration of war (as there often was not), na-
tions at war necessarily had informally declared war by their words or
actions. 35 Because the decision to wage war was itself a declaration of
war, nations informally declared war in the very act of going to war.
28 See STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 73 (2005).
29 See id. at 106 ("In practice, declarations were often pitched at least as much to the
world at large as to the enemy state.").
,30 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 245. Note that the Roman expression "indictio belli,"
meaning "declaration of war," could be defined as either a pronouncement of hostilities to
Roman nationals or to the enemy. See NEFF, supra note 28, at 28.
31 See NEFF, supra note 28, at 26. According to Neff, the last recorded use of heralds as
a method for declaring war was when Sweden declared war against Denmark in 1657. See
id. at 104-05; ERNEST NYs, LE DRorr DE LA GUERRE ET LES PRIECURSEURS DE GROTIUS 111-12
(Paris, Durand et Pedone-Lauriel 1882).
32 See NEFF, supra note 28, at 71-72; see also Nys, supra note 31, at 105-12 (discussing
medieval declarations of war); 2 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSIOEK, QUAESTIONUMJURIS PUBLICI
LIBRI Duo 18-20 (James Brown Scott ed., Tenney Frank, trans., Clarendon Press 1930)
(1737) (noting various ways that wars begin).
3 3 See Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
19, 19-20 (1938).
-14 See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 418, 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
-35 See Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams, supra note 13, at 48.
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There were two categories of informal declarations. The first
consisted of written or oral informal declarations. However official
and weighty these documents or speeches were, they did not formally
proclaim that one nation was "declaring war." Nonetheless, these in-
formal declarations made it clear that one nation had decided to fight
a war. Thus, an assembly speech bristling with belligerence could
serve as a declaration, as could a written defense of why one nation
would fight another. The second category of informal declarations
consisted of declaring war via some hostile act. An authorized inva-
sion of another nation, even if no formal declaration of war preceded
or followed it, was a declaration of war. If France invaded Holland,
that was a French declaration of war against Holland. An invasion was
an unequivocal declaration of war because it rather unmistakably sig-
naled a resolve to wage war.
Less belligerent acts, such as ambassadorial dismissals, blockades,
and aiding a nation at war, also might serve as informal declarations of
war. When these acts signaled that a nation had chosen to wage war,
individuals regarded these hostile actions as informal declarations of
war.
Another dimension of declarations of war was the decision of
what types of hostile actions to order. Declarations typically com-
manded a nation's land and naval forces to attack the enemy. They
also might authorize private parties to wage war, such as permitting
them to take the enemy's naval vessels. Those vested with the "declare
war" power were authorized to make these crucial decisions.
B. Constitutional Text
The categorical theory's claim about the meaning of "declare
war" hardly emerges from the constitutional text. After all, the Consti-
tution never defines "declare war." Hence, it will be impossible to es-
tablish, from an examination of text alone, what "declare war" means.
The most that can be said at this point is that nothing in the Constitu-
tion's text casts doubt on the categorical theory. Thus, if the categori-
cal theory is correct, then Congress may decide whether the nation
will wage war.
Still, a textual theory's plausibility can be judged, in part, by how
well it fits with other textual pieces. The Constitution mentions nu-
merous wartime authorities and restrictions elsewhere. How well do
these other textual pieces cohere with the categorical theory? There
are congressional, executive, federalism, and individual rights pieces.
None of them poses any difficulties for the claim that the original
meaning of "declare war" was to decide to go to war.
[Vol. 93:45
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Consider other grants of authority to Congress. The power to
grant letters of marque and reprisal 36 permits Congress to grant pri-
vate parties the right to seize and profit from enemy shipping. When
a nation concludes that another has injured it, granting letters of mar-
que and reprisal to select individuals can be a measured means of
seeking recompense-more harsh than negotiations but less extreme
than a full-scale war.3 7 In the absence of this separate grant, Congress
likely would have had this power as part of its authority to declare
war.3 8 The same may be said of Congress's power to regulate cap-
tures39-the power to declare war arguably encompassed the power to
regulate captures.40 Finally, a separate grant of the power to govern
and regulate the armed forces41 may have been necessary because the
power to declare war, considered by itself, would not have implied a
power to govern and regulate the armed forces, especially in a Consti-
tution that creates a Commander in Chief.42
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power... [to] grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal .... ).
37 See REVELEY, supra note 9, at 63. Of course, a nation might both declare war and
generally issue letters of marque and reprisal, in which case the letters would not be a step
toward a full-scale war but would be part of a strategy of total war. For an excellent treat-
ment of the meaning of marque and reprisal authority, see Ramsey, supra note 7, at
1613-19.
38 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
98-99 (3d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1858) (saying as much). Blackstone also noted
that the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal "is nearly related to, and plainly
derived from, that other of making war." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *250.
The decision to separately vest the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal likely
resulted from an abundance of caution-ex abundati cautela. See HENRY WHEATON, A Di-
GEST OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIZES 27 (New York, McDermut & D.D.
Arden 1815).
In much the same way, grants of specific executive powers in Article II can be seen as
already included in the broad grant of executive power. Arguably, they were listed out of
an abundance of caution. For a discussion of this principle as it applies to Article 1I, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 577 (1994).
39 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [to] make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water .... ").
40 See WHEATON, supra note 38, at 27. It is hardly odd or unique for the Constitution
to make express certain principles that would have been implicit in the grant of authority
to "declare war." It merely replicates a pattern found elsewhere in the Constitution, partic-
ularly the relationship between the vesting clause of Article II and the rest of Article II. As
James Madison said, albeit in a different context, "[n]othing is more natural nor common
than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particu-
lars." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 263 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In
Article I, section 8, clause 11, the "declare war" power precedes the grants of power over
marque and reprisal and captures, precisely the structure that Madison described.
41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [tlo make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces .... ").
42 See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States .... ").
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Through its power of the purse, 43 Congress may check the Com-
mander in Chiefs conduct of a war. The Constitution prohibits army
appropriations lasting more than two years44-a means of ensuring
that Congress retains firm and periodic control of the Army's fi-
nances. Because the Army requires a new appropriation every two
years, Congress can defund the Army by failing to pass a new appro-
priation, effectively precluding the Army from fighting a war. Con-
gress likewise might withhold funds from all branches of the armed
forces and thereby halt the nation's participation in any war.45
The ability to defund the armed forces and thereby check the
Executive's conduct of a war does not cast doubt on the broad defini-
tion of "declare war." 46 The Congress's ability to declare war and its
separate ability to control funding once war is declared provide it two
distinct means of controlling the use of military force. The Constitu-
tion's belt-and-suspenders approach is designed to ensure that the
government commences and conducts wars with some measure of
public support. Once declared, a war might not go as planned, and
the nation may benefit if Congress can end a war it originally author-
ized. In sum, none of Congress's other war-related authorities casts
doubt on the categorical theory of "declare war."
What of the President? Everyone agrees that under the Constitu-
tion the President cannot "declare war."47 The key issue is to resolve
what words and actions are encompassed within that implied prohibi-
tion. If one accepts the categorical theory's definition of "declare
war," the President cannot take actions that constitute a declaration of
war. Accordingly, the President cannot commence warfare or engage
in other patently hostile actions that serve as declarations of war. To
take such actions unilaterally would be to assume Congress's power to
declare war.
Nonetheless, the President retains significant military authority.
The Commander in Chief Clause 48 that grants the President that fa-
43 For a discussion of how the power of the purse arises from the Necessary and
Proper Clause, see Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1348-50 (1988).
44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years .... ).
45 For a longer discussion of this vital principle of congressional control and the role
it played in ratification, see Yoo, supra note 3, at 279-88.
46 But see id. at 174 (arguing that impeachment and spending are the exclusive con-
gressional checks on executive war making).
47 In my readings, I have never come across any scholar who argued that the Presi-
dent could declare war. It must also be noted that no President apparently has ever
claimed such authority. None of this denies that there are serious disputes about what it
means to "declare war."
48 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States .... ").
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mous title serves several significant purposes, none of which conflicts
with the categorical theory. The Clause makes clear that Congress
does not have the authority to choose a Commander in Chief on its
own. More substantively, it enables the President to control the na-
tion's armed forces in times of war and peace, subject to Congress's
constitutional authorities. The Clause also reveals that the President
may command the militia only when the latter is called into federal
service to execute federal law, to suppress rebellions, or to repel
invasions. 49
Significantly, the President may order acts of national self-de-
fense, even very destructive acts. Under the categorical theory, the
President does not informally declare war against invading nations by
instructing the armed forces to defend the nation's borders against an
armed invasion. 50 Likewise, the President does not declare war by in-
structing the armed forces to act in self-defense. A vessel fired upon
may act to destroy the attacking vessel or plane without thereby de-
claring war.
The difference between these actions and an unauthorized decla-
ration of war reflects the distinction between acting in self-defense
and acting in a manner that commits the nation to a war. As discussed
in Part III, early Presidents repeatedly distinguished between purely
defensive operations and offensive operations designed to take the
war to the enemy. The former were always permissible, while the lat-
ter the Constitution left exclusively with Congress. Hence, fending off
an attack of an aggressor was perfectly acceptable, but the decision to
preemptively wage war was always forbidden. In between were some-
times difficult questions about what military measures Presidents
could order without the resulting conduct of the armed forces rising
to the level of a declaration of war. Admittedly, this distinction-be-
tween actions that amount to an informal declaration of war and ac-
tions that do not-will sometimes be hard to draw in concrete
situations. 51 Nonetheless, it is a distinction found in the Constitution
itself. Even though Congress has the power to declare war, it lacks an
exclusive power to control all uses of military force. 52 Conversely,
while the President may use military force, the President may not or-
der those uses of force that amount to informal declarations of war.
49 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when caled
into the actual Service of the United States .... ) (emphasis added).
50 See infra Part III.A.2.
51 For a little more detail on this issue, see infra Part IV.B.
52 In other words, Congress's exclusive power to declare war does not grant Congress
a monopoly on the ability to order military force. The President has a right to order cer-
tain uses of force as well, so long as he does not informally declare war through his orders
to use force.
2007]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Finally, we come to the other instances in which the Constitution
mentions war. Article I, section 10 provides that states cannot "engage
in war" unless certain exceptions apply or Congress consents.5 3 Pro-
fessor John Yoo has argued that the Constitution would have paral-
leled this language in Article I had "declare war" included the
decision to wage war.5 4 The Constitution might have provided that
absent a congressional declaration of war, the United States could not
"engage in war." That the Constitution did not so provide suggests
that the categorical theory of "declare war" is mistaken, or so the argu-
ment goes.
By granting Congress the power to declare war and not granting
anyone else a concurrent power, the Constitution does provide that the
United States may not engage in war without a congressional declara-
tion, for the very act of engaging in war was understood as an informal
declaration of war. The evidence in Parts II and III will demonstrate
this. Though the Constitution could have included other language
that would have made this point even clearer, the absence of such text
does not weigh against the categorical theory. Indeed, one might say
that if the Constitution was meant to authorize the President to start a
war, Article II would have provided that the President can "engage in
war at his pleasure, subject to funding constraints." One always can
argue that some textual claim is mistaken because the Constitution
could have more clearly endorsed the claim. For good reason, such
arguments have little purchase.
Finally, a skeptic of the categorical theory might cite the use of
war" in Article III. Article IIl, section 3 defines treason to include
"levying war" against the United States. If Congress enjoys a broad
power to declare war, why does not the Treason Clause just provide
that "declaring war" against the United States was an element of trea-
son? The best answer is that the Founders wanted to contrast what
was treason in England with what would be treason in America. The
Founders copied portions of English treason law and omitted
others, 55 thus inviting the inference that the offenses omitted could
not constitute treason. The idea that levying war is treasonous is a
part of English law that the Founders retained.
But what does it mean to levy war? It means no more than to
wage war.56 Accordingly, the powers to declare war and levy war over-
53 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
54 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 255-56.
55 Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort."), with 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *75-94 (describing these two types of
treason along with many other actions that were treasonous in England).
56 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *81-82 (describing levying war as taking up
arms against the King).
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lap to some degree, for to wage war is to declare war. But "declare
war" meant far more than merely commencing it. Among other
things, it included the power to give notice of an impending war and
the power to make conditional declarations of war.5 7 Had the Consti-
tution merely granted Congress the power to "levy war," Congress
might lack many of the functions attributable to declarations of war.
The chief difficulty with reading the Constitution as if it somehow
refuted the categorical theory of the "declare war" power is that so
many people of the era endorsed that theory. As we shall see in Parts
II and III, the original understanding of the power to declare war was
that it encompassed the power to decide whether to wage war and that
this power could be exercised by formal and informal means. The
plausibility of an originalist claim must be judged not only by a bare
examination of constitutional text but also by the extent to which indi-
viduals actually supported or rejected the claim. To suppose that the
Constitution's text somehow refutes or disproves the categorical the-
ory of "declare war" is to imagine that dozens of people in the eight-
eenth century, including monarchs, presidents, legislators, diplomats,
and judges were mistaken about what it meant to "declare war."
C. Constitutional Structure
Congress's power to declare war includes the power to decide
which means of force will be used against the enemy. Congress not
only may decide to wage a full-scale war, but it instead may take more
partial and halting steps along the path to such a war. In other words,
Congress may judge what level of martial force is appropriate in wars
that it commences. In granting Congress the power to decide
whether to fight a war and the level of hostilities that will be brought
to bear, the Constitution creates a unitary war power.
In contrast to this unitary war power theory, the formalist and
pragmatic theories of "declare war" contemplate a divided war power.
Each imagines that the Constitution implicitly bifurcates war powers
between Congress and the President. Sometimes Congress will make
the decision to go to war and sometimes the President will. Some-
times Congress can decide what type of war to fight and sometimes
the President can. The division of war powers implied by these theo-
ries creates anomalies, suggesting that formalist and pragmatic theo-
ries are mistaken.
57 A conditional declaration of war was a document that warned that the declarant
would wage war against another country unless the other country satisfied certain de-
mands. A nation might issue a conditional declaration with the hopes that the other would
see the wisdom of meeting the demands and thereby avoid a war. See 3 HuGo GROTIUS,
THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 635-37 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
1925) (1625). For a longer contemporary discussion of conditional declarations, see
Prakash, supra note 11.
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1. A Unitary War Power
The Constitution grants Congress the power to decide what type
of war America shall fight. At one extreme, Congress may grant a
letter of marque and reprisal to one individual nursing a grievance
against another nation or its nationals, permitting that individual to
make a reprisal sufficient to compensate for a previous injury.58 This
is perhaps the narrowest form of hostility. At the other extreme is
general warfare with Congress requiring the Commander in Chief
and private citizens to commit any and all hostilities against the en-
emy. No further congressional escalation is possible.
In between these extremes lie many war measures. For instance,
Congress can authorize some public captures of enemy property, but
not others (as was true in the undeclared war with France during the
late 1790s) .59 It can issue general letters of marque and reprisal, per-
mitting any American to capture any and all vessels of a foe. Congress
can order a blockade of the enemy's ports, using a combination of the
declare war and marque and reprisal powers. Or it can attempt to
confine a war to certain locations. In this way, Congress can calibrate
the level of warfare that America employs.
Accordingly, the Constitution contemplates that Congress may
decide whether the nation will wage war and what levels of force are
appropriate in that war to achieve American ends. As Justice Samuel
Chase said in Bas v. Tingy, 60 "Congress is empowered to declare a gen-
eral war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in ob-
jects, and in time."6 1 Because the President lacks the power to declare
war, the President lacks the constitutional authority to make these
choices. As Justice William Paterson observed in the same case, "[a]s
far as congress tolerated and authorised the war on our part, so far
may we proceed in hostile operations. ' 62 The more general point is
that Congress may decide the parameters of the war. If Congress
grants a letter of marque and reprisal to an individual, the President
cannot issue general letters. If Congress only grants general letters,
the President cannot use the military to wage war. And most obvi-
ously, if Congress never declares war, the President cannot decide that
the nation will wage war.
Chief Justice John Marshall neatly summed up the unitary war
power view in Talbot v. Seeman6 3 when he observed that the "[t]he
whole powers of war . . . , by the constitution of the United States,
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
59 See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
60 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
61 Id. at 43.
62 Id. at 45.
63 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
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[are] vested in congress. ' 64 Hence, Marshall had no difficulty con-
cluding that Congress could choose to authorize only limited forms of
warfare."5 Later, in Little v. Barreme,6 6 the Court, per the Chief Justice,
held that the President could not sanction captures that Congress had
not permitted. 7 The only lawful captures were the ones that Con-
gress had specifically authorized. A fortiori, the President could not
have ordered general hostilities because that would have left Con-
gress's decision to wage a limited war against France in utter tatters. 68
As a matter of constitutional structure, this allocation of war
power is fundamentally sound because it leaves the decision to go to
war and the question of what level of warfare is appropriate in the
hands of one entity rather than bifurcating those related authorities
between two entities. A unitary war power concentrates responsibility
on Congress and thus does not permit confusion about who is respon-
sible for going to war and who is accountable for the overall level of
force being employed against the enemy. Whether Congress ulti-
mately makes wise decisions or not, at least there is no obscure divi-
sion of authority that might confuse the people.
2. Difficulties with the Formalist Theory
Recall that the formalist view contends that while only Congress
can issue formal declarations of war, the President can actually start a
war.69 One ambiguity with the formalist position is whether Congress,
in its formal declaration of war, may start a war and order the Com-
mander in Chief to commence hostilities. On the one hand, if the
formalist view denies that Congress may start a war and order hostili-
ties, formalists have the unenviable job of explaining why Congress
lacks such power even though these were established features of for-
mal declarations of war .70
On the other hand, if the formalist theory accepts that Congress
may start a war and order hostilities, then formalists must explain why
the Constitution creates two means of going to war, one a formal con-
gressional declaration of war and the other the President's orders to
wage war. The only possible answer-that the Founders wanted to
64 Id. at 28.
65 See id. at 28-29.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
67 See id. at 179.
68 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the
Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 37 (1976).
69 See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
70 See, e.g., His Majesty's Declaration of War Against the French King; Together with
the King's Proclamation for the Distrubtion of Prizes, &c. (May 17, 1756), in 3 NAVAL AND
MILITARY MEMOIRS OF GREAT BRrrAIN FROM 1727 TO 1783, at 102, 102-03 (Robert Beatson
ed., London, Longman, Hurst, Rees & Orme 1804) (reflecting an order of the English
King to his officers to "execute all acts of hostility").
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make it easier to go to war-seems dubious. It makes far more sense
to suppose that the Founders would want to shield a weak nation from
the ravages of war. Creating two parallel mechanisms for going to war
would thwart this goal.
A greater difficulty with the formalist view is that it imagines an
inexplicable division of war powers. First, proponents of the formalist
theory need to explain why the Constitution does not trust the Presi-
dent with the power to formally declare war. What is it about the
power to formally declare war that makes the President unworthy of
wielding such power, especially when, by hypothesis, the President has
the far more consequential power to start a war? One is hard pressed
to rationalize why the chief executive would be denied the traditional
executive power of formally declaring war while enjoying the more
vital power to wage war.
Second, formalists must explain why the President has the greater
power to start a war but wholly lacks the lesser power to grant letters of
marque and reprisal. 71 One can debate the merits of a constitution
that vests the President with the full panoply of war powers; some will
favor such a system and others will oppose it. But what reason can
there be for granting the President the power to start and wage a full-
scale war while simultaneously denying him the far less consequential
power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, a power which would be
quite useful to successfully prosecute that war? This is to read the
Constitution as if it swung the door wide open to presidential wars but
simultaneously, inexplicably, and unhelpfully bolted one window shut.
The formalist theory suffers from two additional problems. First,
it is self-contradictory. The formalist theory, while plausible on the
surface, actually is at war with itself. If the President can wage a war at
will, Congress will lack many of the functions clearly acknowledged to
be part of the power to issue formal declarations of war. To see why
this is so, we need to explore what the "declare war" power encom-
passes. At a minimum, Congress may issue formal declarations of war.
The power to issue such declarations clearly includes the power to
warn of an impending war.72 Hence, a formal declaration of war
might declare that war will occur in ten days. The power to issue for-
mal declarations also encompasses the ability to issue conditional dec-
larations of war-a declaration that threatens war unless another
nation meets certain conditions. 73 Yet if the President may wage war
without any congressional declaration, Congress will effectively lack
both subsidiary powers.
71 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 251.
72 See Twuss, supra note 16, at 58-60 (noting that declarations traditionally gave notice
of impending war).
73 See 3 GROTIUS, supra note 57, at 635-37.
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For instance, suppose Congress was in the midst of debating the
merits of a formal declaration of war that would give advanced warn-
ing of a war. Notwithstanding Congress's power to issue such a decla-
ration, a President could preempt the debate by immediately waging
war. Likewise, a President could start a war while Congress debated a
proposed conditional declaration of war. In either situation, the
Commander in Chief could preempt any congressional declaration of
war that sought to exercise these two standard functions of a formal
declaration. Even worse, the President could thwart congressionally
enacted declarations of war. For instance, suppose Congress passed a
declaration of war giving another nation thirty days warning of im-
pending warfare. The President might nonetheless start a war right
away, thus emasculating Congress's formal declaration. Even more in-
congruous, Congress could issue a conditional declaration, the other
nation might satisfy the ultimatum, and the President might war
against the nation nonetheless. Such an action on the President's
part would render Congress's conditional declaration a total nullity.
The point is that if the President may start a war at will, the Con-
gress cannot be described as having a power to issue formal declara-
tions of war that encompasses some of the most basic functions of
formal declarations. Instead, the President will exercise these func-
tions through the Commander in Chief's supposed ability to wage war
at its discretion. The President, rather than Congress, can warn that
the United States will wage war in ten days. The President, rather
than Congress, can list conditions that another nation must satisfy in
order to avoid war.
This flies in the face of our normal conception of constitutional
powers. Ordinarily, we do not believe that the President may thwart
the exercise of congressional andjudicial powers. While the President
can exercise a veto, the Executive lacks a generic power to negate or
undermine congressional powers. The same is true of Congress-or-
dinarily it cannot thwart either executive or judicial powers. Hence,
Congress cannot, under the guise of carrying into execution its legisla-
tive powers, bar pardons or vetoes.7 4
The President's constitutional authorities, however broad they
may be, should not be read to permit the President to vitiate functions
clearly and uncontroversially associated with the power to declare war.
To say that the Congress may issue formal declarations of war but that
the President may nonetheless start a war at his discretion is to en-
dorse mutually incompatible propositions. One of them must give
way, and since the Constitution clearly grants Congress the power to
declare war and does not similarly endorse the claim that the Presi-
74 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
215 (2005) (reviewing HAROLDJ. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2005)) (arguing the same).
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dent may start a war, the latter proposition should be regarded with
skepticism. At the very least, that proposition should cede way until
there is evidence justifying the counterintuitive idea that although
Congress has the power to declare war, the President may vitiate as-
pects of that power by unilaterally starting a war.
The second problem with the formalist reading is that it makes
the power to declare war rather inconsequential. Recall that under
the formalist theory, the power to declare war is understood as a
power to trigger existing statutes that turn on the presence of a de-
clared war.75 For instance, statutes might provide that if there is a
declared war, there will be rationing of materials necessary for the war
effort, a military draft, and emergency presidential powers. In sum,
the power to declare war can be seen as the power to put the nation
on an emergency footing.
But Congress does not need the power to declare war to do any of
these things. Any legislative power to pass laws includes the power to
modify or suspend the operation of such laws depending upon the
state of the world. Hence, Congress could provide that bankruptcy
laws operate in one fashion in times of prosperity but work differently
in times of depression. Or Congress could decree that patent rights
are diminished in certain exigent circumstances. In a similar way,
Congress could provide that emergency powers, measures, and limita-
tions emerge whenever the nation is at war, whether or not Congress
declares war. For instance, Congress could provide that should the
President start a war, there shall be rationing, a draft, and emergency
presidential powers.
If Congress can accomplish the exact same ends without formally
declaring war, that calls into question the usefulness of having a sepa-
rate power to declare war. The formalist view of "declare war" is dubi-
ous precisely because it imagines that the power to declare war is
rather empty.
3. Difficulties with the Pragmatic Theory
The pragmatic reading of "declare war" has its own set of
problems. Recall that the pragmatic theory supposes that once an-
other nation has declared war against the United States, there is no
need for Congress to declare war in response because a state of war
already exists between the two nations. In fact, according to the prag-
matic theory, the "declare war" power has absolutely no relevance in
that context because a nation cannot declare war in response to an-
other nation's declaration. Rather, the President, as Commander in
75 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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Chief, can wage war as soon as a nation has declared war against the
United States. 76
As with the formalist theory, the pragmatic theory imagines a puz-
zling bifurcation of war powers. Congress has the full panoply of war
powers before another nation declares war-it can decide what type
of war the United States will wage, whether limited or general, and the
Constitution does not authorize the President to make these deci-
sions. However, once another nation declares war, the most impor-
tant of the war powers rest with the President, namely whether and
what type of war the nation will wage. However, at the same time, one
of the minor war powers curiously remains with Congress, namely the
marque and reprisal authority.
One can reasonably maintain that the power to declare war and
the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal ought to rest with
the Congress before the start of a war. And one can sensibly suppose
that both of these powers ought to rest with the President should an-
other nation "force" us into a state of war. But what theory of the
optimal separation of war powers would suggest that once another na-
tion declares war against the United States, the President ought to
decide whether to wage war but that Congress ought to control the
issuance of letters of marque and reprisal? The President can use
whatever weapons are in the arsenal, including nuclear weapons,
against the enemy but cannot be trusted to augment our naval forces
by drawing upon the skill and avarice of private ship owners? The
unsound bifurcation of war powers implicit in the pragmatic theory
casts grave doubt on its plausibility.
Another difficulty associated with the pragmatic view rests on its
implicit premise that certain historical declarations of war were en-
tirely pointless. The pragmatic view supposes that a subcategory of
declarations, response declarations of war, served no real purpose. If
one nation declared war on another, the victim nation did not need to
issue a response declaration of war because the war was already afoot.
The victim nation could immediately wage war without any
declaration.
This premise suffers from two problems. First, why should we
conclude that declarations of war are quite meaningful in one con-
text-at the outset of a war-but inconsequential once another na-
tion has declared war? Nothing in the constitutional grant of the
power to "declare war" suggests this to be the case. Likewise, consider-
ations of constitutional structure supply no reason to suppose that cer-
tain declarations of war are meaningless. If we are to embrace the
view that response declarations of war are inconsequential, one is
76 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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tempted to say that we ought to go further and adopt the formalist
view, a view that largely renders all such declarations inconsequential
and thus has the virtue of consistency. The pragmatic theory shoul-
ders a difficult burden because, in the face of unqualified and categor-
ical text, it supposes that sometimes Congress may decide to wage war
and other times the President may make that decision. A second and
more fundamental problem with the premise that response declara-
tions of war were inconsequential is the too-quick assumption that
once a nation declares war on another nation, the only possible re-
sponse is war and the responding nation need not make any choices.
This view is untenable. When one nation attacks another, the victim
always has choices. Will the victim respond with full-scale war? Will it
instead pursue pacific measures, such as negotiations? Or will it pur-
sue a course of defensive measures, coupled with a stern ultimatum? 77
The pragmatic view assumes that such choices do not exist. It
supposes that the President must wage war against a nation attacking
the United States. But even if we grant the (mistaken) assumption
that the President is in the driver's seat, this conclusion does not fol-
low. A President hopeful for a reconciliation might order a posture of
self-defense with no significant offensive measures. A President with
pacifist leanings might respond to an attack not by ordering Air Force
bombers and the Navy to engage the enemy but by pursuing a negoti-
ated settlement.
This point about the choices the United States must make in re-
sponse to a declaration of war becomes plainer still when we consider
situations where a nation has formally declared war against the United
States but has not yet attacked. Suppose Iran issues a conditional dec-
laration of war against the United States with reasonable conditions
necessary to avoid a war. Under the pragmatic theory, Iran has de-
clared war and hence has preempted any need for Congress to de-
clare war. The President may start bombing Iran right away. Yet it
seems far more sensible to suppose that Congress must decide
whether to respond to Iran's conditional declaration with an uncondi-
tional declaration of war. In this case, there are obvious decisions to
be made about whether to fight a war, and there is little textual reason
to suppose that Congress, the body ordinarily empowered to deter-
mine whether to wage war, cannot decide this issue merely because
Iran issued a conditional declaration of war.
Although the United States' current status as the lone super-
power suggests that Congress typically will respond to force with even
more force, the seeming inevitability of that response cannot dictate
77 As we shall see in Part III, newly independent America did not always wage war in
response to another nation's declaration of war. Sometimes it paid tribute, and other
times it limited itself to purely defensive measures designed to thwart offensive attacks.
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the original meaning of constitutional phrases. The question is
whether there is a choice about whether to wage war even when an-
other nation has declared war on the United States. Once it is under-
stood that a choice exists, the only question is whether the
Constitution permits the President to make that choice or whether
some other entity must make it. If the power to "declare war" includes
the power to decide to wage war, any decision to wage war must be left
to Congress, the only entity empowered to declare war.
II
THE INITIATION DECIARATION OF WAR
Recall that the formalist theory claims that the power to declare
war was nothing more than a power to issue formal declarations. 78
The "declare war" power did not include the ability to decide whether
to wage war.79 The formalist view also denies that nations declared
war by entering a war. If a nation did not issue a document that ex-
pressly "declared war," that nation had not declared war.3°
Contrary to what the formalist theory supposes, evidence from
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries establishes that
Europeans and Americans repeatedly used "declare war" or "declara-
tion of war" to encompass much more than formal declarations of
war. These figures recognized as a declaration of war any signal that a
nation had elected to wage war, however expressed. Consistent with
this usage and the Constitution's allocation of the "declare war"
power, the Founders understood that Congress would decide whether
the nation would wage war. Finally, the Founders rejected the idea
that the President may take the nation to war. They realized that if
the Commander in Chief starts a war, the President usurps Congress's
exclusive power to declare war.
A. European Usage
From ancient times, declarations of war were signals that a nation
had chosen to wage war. The Romans formally declared war prior to
the commencement of warfare. 81 They gave advanced warning to
their enemy presumably because they thought this was the honorable
thing to do8 2 and because the warning might cause the other nation
78 See supra Part I.C.2.
79 See id.
80 See supra text accompanying note 75.
81 SeeJ.W. RICH, DECLARING WAR IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSMA-
RINE EXPANSION 56 (1976).
82 See id.
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to sue for peace. As one might expect, there were exceptions to the
practice of advance warning.8 3
European nations inherited and perpetuated this practice, at
least for a time. At some point, presumably during the early modern
European era, European nations concluded that giving advanced
warning came at too high a cost. They would lose the element of sur-
prise, and with it, perhaps the war as well. Hence, the practice of
issuing formal declarations of war that gave advanced warning fell into
disuse. While formal declarations of war could still serve that purpose,
they rarely did.
Though formal declarations of war and the decision to wage war
were not as closely associated with each other, the link between them
was never totally severed. Europeans continued to associate a nation's
decision to wage war with some sort of declaration of war, either for-
mal or informal. Historian Stephen Neff notes that by the eighteenth
century, "[i] n practice, it came to be accepted that any unambiguous
sign or signal of an intention to resort to war could function as a dec-
laration of war."' s 4 Indeed, as discussed below, most wars were first
declared via some hostile signal rather than by a formal declaration of
war. A nation might issue a formal declaration of war years after an
informal declaration, if at all.
Still, there was nothing truly new about this practice of informal
declarations because from ancient times nonverbal signals had served
as declarations of war. The Romans declared war by throwing an iron-
tipped or fire-hardened wood spear into enemy territory.8 5 When an
enemy state was not adjacent, the Romans designated a spot in the
Roman forum as enemy territory and threw the spear into that
ground. 86 In medieval times, the unfurling of flags and the sending of
a bloody glove ("throwing down the gauntlet") served as declara-
tions. 87 Non-European nations had similar war declaration signals.
For instance, Tripoli declared war by cutting down a nation's flag.88
Seventeenth and eighteenth-century Englishmen well understood
that hostile actions could serve as a declaration of war. In his
memoirs, a seventeenth-century diplomat described how England had
twice declared war against Holland. "No clap of thunder ... could
more astonish the world, than our declaration of war against Hol-
land .... first by matter in fact, in falling upon their Smyrna fleet; and
83 See id.
84 NEFF, supra note 28, at 108-09.
85 See I Liw, THE HISTORY OF ROME 49 (Valerie M. Warrior trans., 2006).
86 NEFF, supra note 28, at 28.
87 Id. at 72.
88 SeeJosHuA E. LONDON, VIcroRY IN TRIPOLI 95 (2005).
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in consequence of that ... by a formal declaration "8.... 9 After an
Admiral destroyed a Spanish fleet in 1718, he argued "that the de-
struction of the Spanish fleet was not to be interpreted into such a
declaration [of war]." ° His denial confirmed that first strikes were
normally seen as declarations of war. Discussing the French and In-
dian war, one author from the era noted that a French armada had
sailed toward America "to strike some important blow, that might
serve for a declaration of war."9' Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, noted in mid-1775 that there was evidence of
an "open and declared war" against Great Britain. 9 2 Presumably he
was referring to, among other things, the famous spring and summer
battles, such as the Battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill. A 1795
book argued that Prime Minister William Pitt had tried to provoke a
formal French declaration "by acts which were in truth and substance,
a declaration of it on his own." -3
Members of Parliament commonly voiced the view that hostile
signals served as declarations of war. Sir Robert Walpole's comments
are particularly telling. Speaking in the Commons, Walpole observed
in 1738 "that of late most Wars have been declar'd from the Mouths of
Cannons, before any formal Declaration" and that if war with Spain
occurred, it was very likely that England would begin it in that same
way. 94 Walpole's comments were hardly isolated. In 1664, Prince Ru-
pert told Parliament that the violent acts of a Dutch admiral were a
"denunciation of War."'9 5 In 1677, a member of the Commons
claimed "[i] s not our men going into France as much a Declaration of
War, as the Motion of sending Money into Germany [to fund a war
there]? '9 6 The next year a member noted that "[i]t is not always req-
uisite in War, that there should be denunciatio belli. . . . -When 4 or
500 men declare War, and the King gives his consent to it, the King of
89 2 WILLIAM TEMPLE, THE WORKS OF SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, BART. 259 (London, S.
Hamilton 1757).
94) J.F. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR 14-15 (London, Her
Majesty's Stationery Office 1883).
91 1 JOHN ENTICK ET AL., THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE LATE AAR 121 (London, Ed-
ward Dilly & John Millan 1763).
92 Letter from Earl of Dartmouth to General Howe (Sept. 22, 1775), American
Archives, Documents of the American Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/
amarch/getdoc.pl?/projecs/artflb/databases/efts/AanArch/IMAGE/.7206.
93 ROBERT ADAIR, A WHIG'S APOLOGY FOR 14IS CONSISTENCY 84 (London, J. Debrett
1795). Later, the book argued that the "insulting dismission [sic] of M. Chauvelin [the
French Ambassador to England] was the substantial declaration of [war]." Id. at 103.
94 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
95 3 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (2d ed.,
London, Butterworths 1873).
96 4 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO
THE YEAR 1694, at 332 (1769), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/re-
port.asp?compid=40399 (debate of March 29, 1677).
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France will ask you no more .... 'Tis now an actual declared War."9 7
Another claimed that if "[w] ar is actually made . . . 'tis then in effect
declared."98 And a third said that war had been "proclaim [ed] ... by
our sending men into Flanders, to assist the Spaniards."9 9 In 1770, a
member complained that the English ought to have regarded Spanish
threats and actions relating to the Falklands as "the most explicit and
effectual declaration of war." 10 0 Speaking of Spanish conduct in 1779,
a member asserted that they were "a positive declaration of war...
only reserving to themselves the precise period, when and where to
strike the first blow."''
l
As one might expect, English monarchs shared the view that hos-
tile signals were declarations. In 1689, William III regarded "the War
to be so much already declar'd by France against England."1 0 2 France
did not formally declare war until a month later,'0 3 so William pre-
sumably referred to French hostilities. Similarly, George III treated a
clash between French and English ships in July 1778 as evidence that
the French had "cast off the Mask and declared war."' 1 4 In both cases,
the French had declared war because their actions revealed that they
had chosen to wage war.'0 5
Those on the Continent shared the view that to wage war was to
declare it. In 1754, upon learning that England had dispatched a fleet
to attack French ships, the French ambassador declared that "his
master would consider the first gun that was fired as a declaration of
War."' 1 6 In 1788, hostilities that broke out between Russia and Swe-
den were "considered and treated by each as a declaration of war."'
0 7
97 5 id. at 161, available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=40984
(debate of February 18, 1678).
98 Id. at 261, available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=40989
(debate of March 19, 1678).
99 Id. at 248, available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=40988
(debate of March 15, 1678).
100 Speech of Colonel Barre (1770), in 2 THE ELOQUENCE OF THE BRITISH SENATE 74,
75 (William Hazlitt ed., Brooklyn, Thomas Kirk 1810).
101 12 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 138 (London, J. Almon 1779).
102 The Convention Parliament (William): The Convention becomes a Parliament, Be-
gins 20/2/1689, 2 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, http://
www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37645 (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
103 11 THE HISTORIAN'S HISTORY OF THE WORLD 601 (Henry Smith Williams ed., 1904).
104 See Letter from the King to Lord North (July 18, 1778), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD FROM 1760 TO DECEMBER 1783, at 180, 180 (John Fortescue ed.,
1928).
105 English courts apparently shared the same understanding of "declare war" voiced
in Parliament and by monarchs. See RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 225-26 ("Where is the differ-
ence, whether war is proclaimed by a Herald . . . or whether war is announced by royal
ships, and whole fleets, at the mouths of cannon?" (quoting The Maria Magdalena, 165 Eng.
Rep. 57, 58 (1779))).
106 3 PHILLIMORE, supra note 95, at 96.
107 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR
THE YEAR 1788, at 75-76 (London, J. Dodsley 1790).
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The Ottomans warned Napoleon that any attack on Egypt would be a
declaration of war. OS Emperor Alexander of Russia noted that Napo-
leon "by a sudden attack on our troops at Kowno, has declared
war. " 109
During its war with virtually all of Europe, Republican France re-
peatedly regarded hostile acts as declarations. In 1792, the National
Assembly cited the King of Hungary and Bohemia's support of French
malcontents and his hostile preparations as a "declaration of war."1 1 0
A French legislator claimed that the English King had "declare[d]
war" when he dismissed the French ambassador, expressed grief at the
execution of Louis XVI, and demanded that Parliament appropriate
funds for a larger army.III Consistent with that legislator's assertion,
France's formal declaration asserted that English "acts of hostility"
were the "equivalent to a declaration of war."'1 12 France's formal dec-
laration against Spain likewise accused Spain of declaring war by its
hostilities.'' 1'
As the above discussion reveals, a number of hostile signals falling
short of actual warfare were regarded as declarations of war. For in-
stance, a nation's issuance of general letters of marque and reprisal
was a declaration of war.' 14 These letters authorized individuals to
capture enemy ships, in return for which the capturing party would
share in the proceeds from the sale of the captured goods." 5 If a
nation generally authorized its populace to capture ships of another
nation, the first nation clearly had decided to wage war. Likewise, in-
dividuals understood that a blockade could serve as a declaration of
war," 6 for it suggested that the blockading nation had decided to
wage war against the victim.
108 See 4 WALTER SCOTr, THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH
90-91 (Edinburgh, Ballantyne & Co. 1827). Egypt was then a part of the Ottoman Empire.
109 MAURICE, supra note 90, at 44.
110 Decree of War Against the King of Hungary and Bohemia (Apr. 20, 1792), in 1 A
COLLECTION OF STATE PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE WAR AGAINST FRANCE 18, 19 (London, J.
Debrett 1794) [hereinafter A COLLECTION OF STATE PAPERS].
III EXTRACTS FROM THE DISCUSSION IN THE SITTING OF THE CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 1,
ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ENGLAND AND HOLLAND, in A COLLECTION OF AD-
DRESSES TRANSMITTED BY CERTAIN ENGLISH CLUBS AND SOCIETIES TO THE NATIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF FRANCE 148, 149 (2d ed., London,J. Debrett 1793) [hereinafter A COLLECTION OF
ADDRESSES].
112 Decree Which Declares that the French Republic Is at War with the King of En-
gland and the Stadtholder of the United Provinces, in A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES, supra
note 111, at 157, 161.
113 Declaration of War by France Against Charles IV, King of Spain, in 1 A COLLECTION
OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 98, 99.
114 See NEFF, supra note 28, at 109; see also H. W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 470-73
(New York, D. Van Nostrand 1861).
115 See NEFF, supra note 28, at 109.
116 See 2 WILLIAM SMYTH, LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY, FROM THE IRRUPTION OF THE
NORTHERN NATIONS TO THE CLOSE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 385 (London, William
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Another measure nations regarded as a declaration of war was
aiding a warring nation when there was no preexisting obligation to
do so. 1 17 For instance, if one nation made a treaty of alliance with a
nation at war, the other warring nation generally viewed the treaty as a
declaration directed against it. During the Revolutionary War, En-
gland warned the Dutch that if they ever made a treaty with the rebel-
lious Americans, England would regard it as a "commencement of
hostilities and a declaration of war."'18 A 1789 book on the history of
Athens noted that when the Athenians entered into a treaty with a
state already at war, this "was surely equivalent to a declaration of
war."1 9 In December of 1791, the French National Assembly issued a
Manifesto which asked the rhetorical question "[is it not equivalent
to a declaration of war, to give places of strength not only to ene-
mies . . . but [also] to conspirators" who fight France?12o Tippu Sul-
tan, the scourge of the English in southern India, was said to have
made the "equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous dec-
laration of war" by making a treaty with France and by admitting its
soldiers into his army.121 In 1807, the English said that the Dutch had
declared war against England by making a treaty with the French
while England and France were at war.' 22
Perhaps the most famous informal declaration of this type was
France's 1778 notification of its Treaty of Alliance with America.
When the French Ambassador notified the English, an English minis-
ter almost wept tears of anger (or so the French Ambassador
claimed). 123 One Englishman said the notification was 'justly consid-
Pickering, J &J.J. Deighton 1840) (describing American colonists as likely to perceive the
blockade of Boston as a declaration of war); Appendix (Nov. 1774), American Archives,
Documents of the American Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/
getdoc.pl?/projects/artflb/databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.1763 (last visited Aug. 26,
2007) (same); The British American, No. 9 (July 28, 1774), American Archives, Documents
of the American Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/
projects/artflb/databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.730 (same); Considerations on the Mea-
sures Carrying on with Respect to the British Colonies in North America (Apr. 1774),
American Archives, Documents of the American Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/
cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/projects/artflb/databases/efts/AnArch/IMAGE/. 1762 (last
visited Aug. 26, 2007) (same).
117 NEFF, supra note 28, at 109.
118 J. Adams to the President of Congress (Dec. 18, 1780), in 4 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLO-
MATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 13, at 197, 197 (quoting English remonstrance to Hol-
land of December 12, 1780).
119 WILLIAM YOUNG, THE HISTORY OF ATHENS 156 (London, J. Robson 1786).
120 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR
THE YEAR 1791, at 211 (2d ed., London, Baldwin, Craddock &Joy 1824).
121 ALEXANDER BEATSON, A VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND CONDUCT OF THE IWAR WITH TIP-
POO SULTAUN II (London, W. Bulmer & Co. 1800). At the time, the English and the
French were at war.
122 MAURICE, supra note 90, at vi-vii.
123 STACY SCHIFF, A GREAT IMPROVISATION 139 (2005).
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ered as a declaration of war." 124 Another said it was "impossible, with-
out insulting in too gross a manner both truth and reason, to deny
that the declaration ... ought to be received as a true declaration of
war." 125 George III himself wrote that the notification "is certainly
equivalent to a declaration."' 2 6 Commenting much later, jurist and
international law expert Sir Robert Phillimore observed that France
"declared war" against England when she announced the Treaty, sent
ships to America to wage war, and recalled her ambassador.1 27
As Phillimore's last comment suggests, nations saw the withdraw-
ing of one's own ambassador or dismissing another nation's ambassa-
dor in antagonistic circumstances as a declaration of war, presumably
because either action signaled the end of parleying and the onset of a
war. When the English demanded that the Genoese dismiss the
French ambassador, the Genoese refused on the ground that to do so
would be "positively declaring war" against France.12  Likewise, when
France recalled its ambassador from England in 1850, that recall was
the French declaration of war. 129
Highly provocative measures might serve as a declaration of war,
at least where they signified that war was forthcoming. For example,
in 1804, an English parliamentarian made this insightful comment
about the actions of Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor:
It is the common law of Europe, that every power ought to consider
the assembling of troops, the formation of magazines, the baking of
biscuits, levies of horses for waggons [sic], as a declaration of war. 131
Why was this so? Because when nations amassed troops and supplies
at a tremendous expense, it was clear they had decided to wage war.
Francis's actions signaled, at least to the English legislator, that he had
chosen to wage war and hence Francis had declared it.
At the extreme, nations might regard mere evasion or silence as
an implicit declaration of war. In 1756, the Prussian King demanded
that if the Austrian Empress wanted peace, she would have to make an
unambiguous declaration that she was not about to attack Prussia. On
the other hand, "he [would] look upon any ambiguous answer as a
124 3 JOHN ANDREWS, A HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA, FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOL-
LAND 212 (London, John Fielding & John Jarvis 1786).
125 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR
THE YEAR 1779, at 411 (2d ed., London, J. Dodsley 1786).
126 Letter from George III to Lord North (Mar. 13, 1778), in 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF GEORGE THE THIRD WITH LORD NORTH FROM 1768 TO 1783, at 148, 148 (W. Bodham
Donne ed., London, John Murray 1867).
127 3 PHILLIMORE, supra note 95, at 103.
128 THE CHRONOLOGIST OF THE PRESENT IWAR 211-12 (London, J.W. Myers 1796).
129 See MAURICE, supra note 90, at 6.
130 6 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT TIME lxxiii
(T.C. Hansard ed., London, Longman et al. 1806).
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declaration of war."' 3 1 The English gave a similar ultimatum to the
Spanish in 1761. England wanted to know if Spain was contemplating
an alliance with France against England. The English King declared
that he would regard a refusal to answer the question as "an aggres-
sion on the part of Spain, and an absolute declaration of war."13 2 The
Spanish ambassador, put off by English "haughtiness," 3 3 said that this
English attitude was itself a "declaration of war."1 34 In his formal dec-
laration, George III accused Spain of declaring war "in effect" with its
response to his query.' 35 Somewhat comically, the Spanish King is-
sued a formal declaration noting that he had already treated En-
gland's disrespectful query as "a declaration of war by England" and
that it was unnecessary for England to re-declare war. 136
There are sound reasons why a nation would treat silence or eva-
sion as a declaration of war. When a nation demands assurances that
it will not be attacked and such assurances are not given, it reasonably
might conclude that the nation unwilling to give such assurances had
decided to wage war and was merely waiting for a propitious moment
to attack. Because the decision to wage war was a declaration of war,
these nations, by maintaining silence in that context, effectively con-
firmed that they had secretly decided to go to war and had thereby
declared war.
Sometimes nations sought to shift blame for the start of a war by
claiming that some nation's action or failure to take an action was a
declaration of war. The Austrian Emperor in 1784 delivered an "ulti-
matum" to the Dutch demanding "free and unlimited navigation of
the Scheld in both branches to the sea.... [If] any insult [was] of-
fered to the imperial flag in the execution of these ideas, he should be
obliged to consider it as a formal declaration of war."'137 Since the
Dutch controlled the Scheld River, the Emperor was acting provoca-
tively. During its war with Europe, France declared that any nation
whose ships transported British goods through a particular sound
131 JOHN ALMON, A NEW MILITARY DICTIONARY 61 (London, J. Cook 1760) (using a
pseudonym).
132 THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR, THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT WAR: FROM THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES IN 1755 AND CONTINUED DURING THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1756, 1757,
1758, 1759,1760 AND TO THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN, 1761, at 248 (London, R. &J. Dodsley
1762).
133 Id. at 248-49.
134 Id.
135 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR
THE YEAR 1761, at 287 (London, R. &J. Dodley 1762).
136 Id. at 288.
137 4 W. BELSHAM, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III. TO THE SESSION OF PARLIA-
MENT ENDING A.D. 1793, at 167 (5th ed., London, G.G. &J. Robinson 1795). The Emperor
then sent a ship which the Dutch stopped. But the Emperor shrank from the fight. See id.
at 168-78.
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would be regarded as declaring war. 138 In a similar fashion, Sicily de-
manded that France withdraw from Rome and noted that a "negative
answer" to this ultimatum would be "a declaration of war."1 ' 9 Russia
made an incredible demand of the Ottoman Empire: unless the latter
declared war against France, Russia would consider the Ottomans as
having declared war on Russia. 140 Each of these episodes marked an
attempt to stretch the definition of "declare war" beyond all limits.
The refusal to satisfy unreasonable demands in no way indicated a
decision to wage, and therefore declare, war. Instead, the extreme
demands were merely attempts to shift the blame for the beginning of
the war onto the other nation.
While authors of international law treatises were primarily con-
cerned with whether and when nations had to issue formal declara-
tions of war, they certainly understood that nations might declare war
by informal means. Professor Michael Ramsey has ably canvassed
these sources before, 14 so only a few comments seem necessary. As
Professor Ramsey has demonstrated, Cornelius Bynkershoek believed
that Article IX of the Treaty of Utrecht used the phrase "declare war"
as a synonym for commencing a war and not merely as the power to
formally proclaim war. 142 Hugo Grotius recounted the Roman prac-
tice of declaring war by throwing a spear into enemy territory1 43 and
also spoke of "formal" declarations, thus implicitly acknowledging that
there was a category of informal declarations of war. 144 Emmerich de
Vattel claimed that "when one nation takes up arms against another,
she from that moment declares herself an enemy to all the individuals
of the latter."'145 Christian Wolff confirmed that allying with a party to
war was a declaration of war: "[H] e who allies himself to my enemy, as
by sending troops or subsidies, or by assisting him in any other way,
declares by that very fact that he wishes to be a participant in the war
carried on against me."'146
Though Blackstone said little about declarations, what he did say
confirms that to decide to wage war was to declare it. He noted that
138 See Proclamation (May 15, 1798), in 7 A COLLECIrON OF STATE PAPERS, supra note
110, at 83, 83 (London, J. Debrett 1799).
139 Answer of General Mack to General Championet (Nov. 24, 1798), in 8 A COLLEC-
TION OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 108, 108 (London, J. Debrett 1800).
140 Manifesto of the Sublime Porte, Communicated to Our Esteemed Friend the Minis-
ter Plenipotentiary of the Court of Great Britan, in Constantinople (Sept. 11, 1798), in 7 A
COLLECTION OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 446, 449-50 (London, J. Debrett 1799).
141 See Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1590-95.
142 See 2 VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 32, at 132.
143 See 3 GROTIUS, supra note 57, at 637.
144 See id. at 636-37.
145 VA1TTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 399 (London, G.G. &J. Robinson 1797).
146 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM § 734, at
377 (Joseph H. Drake & FrancisJ. Hemelt trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764).
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pirates declare war on mankind when they engage in their depreda-
tions and that mankind may declare war on them in like manner. 147
Clearly, Blackstone referred to hostile actions and not formal declara-
tions, for pirates were not in the habit of issuing the latter. Earlier in
his Commentaries, Blackstone discussed why he (erroneously) be-
lieved that formal declarations of war were required under the En-
glish system. He continued by saying that "wherever the right resides
of beginning a national war," there must also reside a peace power.148
This sentence, coming as it does on the heels of a discussion of the
power to declare war,149 clearly equates declaring war with the right to
begin a war. Like other Englishmen, Blackstone knew that the "de-
clare war" power included the right to decide whether to wage war.
Jacques Necker, a French statesman who authored a two volume
treatise on executive power, likewise endorsed this common under-
standing of "declare war." Necker criticized the grant of "declare war"
authority to the legislature found in the French Constitution of 1791.
Under that Constitution, only the Assembly could declare war.
Necker complained that this put France at a disadvantage because
other countries had monarchs who "declare [d] war by actually com-
mencing it."' 150 He later noted that "hostilities are commonly consid-
ered as the strongest declaration of war.' 5 Earlier, Necker argued
that the French Constitution contained certain provisions that actually
permitted the King to commence hostilities. 152 He claimed that these
provisions were deliberately left ambiguous because had the Constitu-
tion expressly authorized the King to wage war and also vested the
Assembly with "declare war" authority, it would have "excited the
laughter of all Europe."'153 Such wording would have provoked deri-
sion precisely because across Europe it was understood that to decide
to wage war was to declare it. 154
Necker's observations (and the practices that underlay them)
were confirmed in the writings of nineteenth-century scholars. Georg
Martens noted that some nations insist that they need not declare war
in certain situations because "war has been tacitly declared," so that
goods taken in war without a formal declaration did not have to be
restored.15 5 An Oxford scholar observed that "[c]ases have occurred
147 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *71.
148 1 id. at *250.
149 Id.
150 1 NECKER, supra note 14, at 271.
151 Id. at 273.
152 See id. at 276-77.
153 Id. at 277.
154 Id.
155 G.F. VON MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 282 (William Cobbett
trans., Pall-Mall, Cobbett & Morgan 1802).
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in which a hostile demonstration has been held to amount to a virtual
declaration of war."' 5", Francis Wharton, a Department of State solici-
tor, wrote that a "declaration of war ... may be implied: as where an
act of hostilities takes place which can be explained on no other hy-
pothesis."'157 Joseph Chitty's comments bear quoting in full. In "A
Practical Treatise on the Law of Nations," Chitty writes:
[D]eclarations of war are not construed to take effect merely from
the time when a formal notification of hostility is given; there are
certain preceding acts, of a hostile nature, which are deemed to be
virtually declarations of war .... 158
Chitty went on to note that when a nation has been injured and does
not receive redress, "she is reduced to consider hostilities as virtually
declared."'15 9 Chitty's comments, written in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, nicely sum up the practices of European nations for the previous
two centuries.
All across Europe, monarchs, ministers, legislators, and many
others understood "declare war" to mean that a nation had chosen to
wage war. Hence, while a nation might declare war by a formal decla-
ration, many other actions that evinced a decision to wage war were
likewise declarations of war. Most significantly, commencing warfare
against another nation was an absolute and unequivocal declaration
of war.
B. American Usage
Though eighteenth-century America might have seemed far re-
moved from Europe, Americans shared the European understanding
of "declare war" and "declaration of war." They treated documents
that evinced a warring disposition as declarations of war even if the
documents never said as much. Likewise, the commencement of war-
fare was an informal declaration of war. Finally, Americans regarded
various hostile actions short of actual warfare as declarations of war.
1. Early American Understandings
Well before contemplating the Constitution, Americans under-
stood that to commence war was to declare war. In 1756, the English
dispatched George Washington to attack the French. George II al-
ready had formally declared war on the French. Notwithstanding that
declaration, Washington confessed his ignorance to the Virginia Lieu-
tenant Governor regarding the ceremony required "[i]f war is to be
156 Twiss, supra note 16, at 75.
157 FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAw 302 (Phila., Kay & Brother 1884).
158 JOSEPH Ctiirr, A PRAcTiICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 68 (Boston, Brad-
ford & Read 1812).
159 Id. at 69; see also id. at 70, 80 (discussing virtual or implied declarations of war).
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declared at this place." 160 Robert Dinwiddie answered, "[t] he Method
You are to declare War, is at the head of Your Companies with three
Vollies of Small Arms for his Majesty's Health & a successful War."' 161
In this way, the English ordered Washington to declare war-to com-
mence warfare-in a particular theater on behalf of the Crown. In
mid-1775, an American pamphleteer claimed that by attempting to
destroy some colonial munitions, British General Thomas Gage had
declared war: "The invasion of property, among all Nations, is justly
deemed a declaration of war."1 62 Richard Henry Lee noted in 1778
that French Admiral D'Estaing had "declared war against G. Britain
on board his fleet."' 63 Though France had not (and never would)
formally declared war, orders to commence war were the equivalent.
In 1784, Major-General Peter Muhlenberg wrote that "cutting off the
head of [a man] is looked upon by those who are best acquainted with
the customs of the Indians as a declaration of war." 164 Muhlenberg
evidently meant that when Indians beheaded someone, that action in-
dicated a resolve to wage war.
Americans understood that the seizure of ships could be a decla-
ration of war, albeit perhaps a limited one. In 1776, a delegate to the
Continental Congress wrote that "the Portugees have declared War
Against us by Seizing Our Vessels in their Ports."'165 In 1777, the
American representative in Martinique thought that if England did
not return a ship to the French, the French would deem it "allmost a
Declaration of War." 166 Indeed, a much larger English seizure later in
the year was met with a French ultimatum-any hesitation in re-
160 Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie (Aug. 14, 1756), American
Memory from the Library of Congress, http://rs6.oc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gw-
series2.html (for a scan of the original document, follow "Letterbook 3", then enter "329"
in the text box next to the "Turn to image" button and click that button).
161 Letter from Robert Dinwiddie to George Washington (Aug. 21, 1756), American
Memory from the Library of Congress, http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(lw010217)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the
"IMAGES" hyperlink).
162 Junius Americanus, Address to General Gage (May 29, 1775), American Archives,
Documents of the American Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/
getdoc.pl?/projects/artflb/databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.3187.
163 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee (July 12, 1778), in 10
LETrERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 265, 265 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1983).
164 HENRY A. MUHLENBERG, THE LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL PETER MUHLENBERG OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY 440 (Phila., Carey & Hart 1849). In a similar vein, the Superinten-
dent of Indian Affairs for the Northern Colonies, Sir William Johnson, wrote in 1772 that
the Native Americans considered scalping to be "a National Act and Declaration of War."
George H. Bray III, Scalping During the French and Indian War, Archiving Early America,
http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/1998/scalping.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
165 Letter from Abraham Clark to Elias Dayton (Aug. 6, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF DELE-
GATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 626, 628 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979).
166 Letter from Mann Page to John Page (June 9, 1777), in 25 LETTERS OF DELEGATES
TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 623, 624 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1998).
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turning the ships would be a declaration of war. 167 In each of these
situations, Americans saw the seizure as a declaration of war because
of what they thought the seizure signaled, namely recourse to war.
As in Europe, less hostile actions than outright hostilities were
also seen as declarations of war. In 1774, John Adams proposed that if
anyone were arrested in any colony and taken to England for trial,
such action ought to be considered a declaration of war. 16 During
the Revolutionary War, Silas Deane reported that while private
Spaniards might lend America ships, the King of Spain would not do
so because that "would be the same as a declaration of war."' 69 Deane
evidently understood that nations generally viewed providing aid to a
party to a war as a declaration of war. In 1787, Ambassador Thomas
Jefferson reported to Foreign Affairs Secretary John Jay that the En-
glish had withdrawn from a treaty with France requiring notification
of naval armament. 171' Apparently viewing the withdrawal as evidence
of a design to wage war, the French regarded it as a declaration of
war.
17 1
Of course, Americans were well aware of what transpired in En-
gland and on the Continent during the Revolutionary War and the
period that followed. They knew that France viewed the English reac-
tion to the notification of the American treaty as a declaration of
war. 172 Likewise, Americans knew that the Austrian Emperor had
warned that he would regard Dutch insults to his ships plying the
Scheld River as a declaration of war.1 73
As in Europe, a document could be a declaration of war even if it
never used the words "declare war." One delegate to Congress argued
that the Suffolk Resolves were a declaration of war against England.17 4
167 Letter from James Duane to George Clinton (Nov. 23, 1777), in 8 LETTERS OF DELE-
GATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 307, 307 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1981).
168 John Adams's Proposed Resolutions (Sept. 30, 1774), in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES
TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 131, 131 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976).
169 Letter from Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence (Nov. 27,
1776), in 2 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 13, at 195, 196.
170 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Sept. 22, 1787), in 2 MEMOIR, CORRE-
SPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 240, 240 (Thomas
Jefferson Randolph ed., Charlottesville, F. Carr & Co. 1829).
171 See id.
172 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee, supra note 163, at
266-67 (noting that the French considered the King's message to Parliament a declaration
of war).
173 See Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to Alexander Martin (Dec. 18, 1784), in 22
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 79, 79-80 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995).
174 SeeJoseph Galloway's Statement on His Plan of Union (Sept. 28, 1774), in I LET-
TERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 168, at 119, 120 (describing the
Suffolk Resolves as a declaration of war). The 1774 Suffolk Resolves were a set of resolu-
tions issued by leaders from Suffolk County, Massachusetts. These resolutions denounced
the English Coercive Acts, called for a boycott of English goods, and sought a colonial
militia. SeeJOSEPH C. MORTON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 140 (2003).
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Another regarded the Declaration Setting Forth the Causes and Ne-
cessity of Taking Up Arms as America's declaration. 17 5 John Adams
argued that if anyone at an international summit denied American
sovereignty, that would be "a declaration of war against" the United
States. 1 76 As one might imagine, Americans fighting for indepen-
dence were especially sensitive to denials of sovereignty. Most fa-
mously, Americans regarded the Declaration of Independence as a
declaration of war. 177
Perhaps the best example of the American conception of "de-
clare war" comes from John Adams. Writing to his cousin Samuel Ad-
ams in 1779, John Adams expressed surprise at the former's failure to
appreciate that France and Britain already had declared war:
Was not war sufficiently declared in the King of England's speech,
and in the answers of both houses, and in the recall of his ambassa-
dor? Has it not been sufficiently declared by actual hostilities in
most parts of the world? I suspect there will never be any other
declaration of war. Yet there is in fact as complete a war as ever
existed. 1 78
Well aware that neither England nor France had issued a formal dec-
laration of war, Adams nonetheless had no difficulty concluding that
both had declared war.
2. American Treaties
Fledgling America took her place on the international stage by
making treaties. Even before the 1783 English Peace Treaty, America
made treaties with France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. After the
Constitution's ratification, the pace of treaty making quickened. 79
These treaties provide useful evidence of the meaning of "declare
war," confirming that "declaration of war" was a synonym for the start
of warfare.
175 See Letter from Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston (July 8, 1775), in 1 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 168, at 612, 613-14 (noting that Congress
recently had published a declaration of war). This 1775 declaration explained to the world
why Americans had taken up arms against England, and some Englishmen apparently re-
garded it as a declaration of war as well. See Debate, Comments of Lord Mansfield in the
House of Lords (Mar. 14, 1776), American Archives, Documents of the American Revolu-
tion, available at http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/projects/arfflb/
databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.16027 (saying that Americans will reprint their "declara-
tion of war" if England wishes to see a list of grievances).
176 See Letter from J. Adams to Vergennes (July 19, 1781), in 4 REVOLUTIONARY DipLO-
MATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 13, at 591, 593.
177 SeeYoo, supra note 3, at 246-47.
178 Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams, supra note 13, at 48.
179 See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing the various treaties
signed before and after the ratification of the Constitution).
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In 1776, Congress approved the outlines of a model treaty.' 80 Ar-
ticle 16 provided that goods of the contracting parties found on en-
emy ships could be confiscated, save for those goods loaded "before
the Declaration of War" or where the owner was unaware of the decla-
ration.' 8 1 Presumably to prevent confusion, the Article repeated the
exception, this time substituting "before the War" for "before the Dec-
laration of War."' I 2 Clearly this model treaty regarded these two
phrases as synonymous. These phrases could be synonymous only if
the drafters understood that all wars begin with some sort of declara-
tion. In other words, the model treaty used the phrases interchangea-
bly because it was generally accepted that every war begins with an
informal or formal declaration. Hence, "before the Declaration of
War" necessarily meant "before the War."
Another model treaty provision points to the same conclusion.
Article 23 provided that if the two parties to the treaty warred against
each other, their citizens had six months after the "proclamation of
war" to sell and transport their belongings. 8 3 This provision must
have endorsed the idea that a nation could informally declare war be-
cause it evidently meant to grant citizens six months to gather their
property after the formal or informal proclamation of war. If one
reads the treaty as referencing only formal declarations of war, the
treaty generates rather odd results. First, had the treaty incorporated
only the formal sense of "proclamation of war" that would have meant
that if there was never a formal declaration in a war, there would be
no grace period at all. It is hard to fathom why citizens would be
given a grace period only when the parties actually issued a formal
declaration of war. To the contrary, a grace period was more impor-
tant when there was no formal declaration of war that clearly marked
the beginning of a conflict because citizens were less likely to know of
the war in such a circumstance and thus more likely to need the grace
period. Second, and more importantly, a narrow, formal reading
would lead to the odd result that had a war been fought for two years
and then a formal declaration made in the midst of the war (as was
often the case) ,184 citizens would have a six month grace period only
after the very belated formal declaration of war. But citizens would
lack any grace period for the period immediately following the actual
commencement of the war, the very moment in which people were
most likely to need a grace period because they might not know of the
180 See Plan of Treaties, in 5JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 576, 576 (Worth-
ington Chauncery Ford ed., 1906) (Entry for July 18, 1776).
181 See id. at 581-82.
182 Id.
183 See id. at 584.
184 Yoo, supra note 3, at 215 (noting that many nations did not formally declare war
until after the commencement of hostilities).
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war. There was no reason to give citizens a grace period in the midst
of a hotly fought and well-known war. The grace period was clearly
meant to begin at the onset of a war because the drafters understood
that all wars commenced with some kind of declaration of war.
Finally, and most tellingly, Article 7 of the model treaty provided
that if England "should declare war" on France, the United States
would not supply men, money, or ships to England. 8 5 If the treaty
meant to apply the narrow, formal definition of "declare war," it
would permit America to supply England with these items should En-
gland never formally declare war against France. The more appropri-
ate construction would be one that read "declare war" to encompass
actions like waging a war, a construction widely shared in Europe and
America. This broad understanding would prohibit chicanery on the
part of England and America. On this reading, whether England for-
mally or informally declared war against France, America could not
aid England.
This model treaty did not rot away in some drawer. Treaties
made with France,186 the Netherlands, 187 and Sweden' 18 prior to the
Constitution contained analogs of Articles 16 and 23. Treaties made
with France, 18 9 Spain, 190 and Tunis' 9 ' after the Constitution's ratifica-
tion contained analogs of Article 23. The nation and its treaty part-
ners thereby publicly endorsed the prevalent understanding that to
wage war was to declare it.
A 1795 American treaty with Algiers was certainly constructed
with this understanding of "declare war" in mind. The last Article of
this treaty provided that if a party breached the treaty, "war shall not
be declared immediately; but every thing shall be searched into regu-
larly: the Party injured shall be made reparation." 9 2 Apply the broad
definition of declare war and the treaty makes clear that there could
185 See Plan of Treaties, supra note 180, at 579. Evidently, the model treaty was made
with France in mind.
186 See Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and His
Most Christian Majesty, U.S.-Fr., arts. XIV, XX, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12, 20, 24.
187 See Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between Their High Mightinesses the States
General of the United Netherlands, and the United States of America, U.S.-Neth., arts. XII,
XVIII, Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32, 40, 42.
188 See Treaty of Amity and Commerce Concluded Between His Majesty the King of
Sweden and the United States of North-America, U.S.-Swed., arts. XIV, XXII, Apr. 3, 1783,
8 Stat. 60, 68, 72-74.
189 See Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America,
U.S.-Fr., art. XIII, Sept. 3, 1800, 8 Stat. 178, 184.
190 See Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation Between the United States of
America, and the King of Spain, U.S.-Spain, art. XIII, Oct. 17, 1795, 8 Stat. 138, 144.
191 See Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States and Tunis, U.S.-
Tunis, art. XXIII, Mar. 26, 1799, 8 Stat. 157, 160.
192 A Treaty of Peace and Amity Between the Dey of Algiers and the United States of
America, U.S.-Algiers, art. XXII, Sept. 5, 1795, 8 Stat. 133, 136.
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be no immediate resort to hostilities. Neither nation could either for-
mally declare war or make an informal declaration through the com-
mencement of warfare. Apply the narrow, formalist definition of
"declare war" and the Algerian treaty becomes nonsensical. The nar-
row definition suggests that warfare is perfectly permissible so long as
neither nation ever issued a formal declaration. As applied to the Al-
gerian treaty, the formalist reading of "declare war" leads to a wholly
implausible construction.
Lending support to these readings is diplomatic correspondence
discussing the 1778 Treaty of Commerce between America and
France. The French confiscated an American's goods found onboard
an English ship. 19 3 In a letter to France, America's representatives
argued that the confiscation was within the treaty's safe-harbor provi-
sion because the confiscation occurred within two months of the dec-
laration of war.194 They offered to show when the goods were loaded
to prove their point) 95 Had the treaty's reference to "declaration of
war" only encompassed formal declarations of war, the American rep-
resentatives could have made no argument whatsoever, for neither the
British nor the French ever formally declared war on each other dur-
ing the Revolutionary War. The American representatives were evi-
dently using the start of the war between France and England as the
point at which there was a "declaration of war" within the meaning of
the treaty. In other words, the safe harbor provided relief precisely
because the American representatives read the treaty as covering in-
formal declarations of war, such as the commencement of warfare.
The arguments of the American diplomats-Benjamin Franklin, John
Adams, and Arthur Lee-count as powerful evidence that "declare
war" was understood in a broad sense to include the commencement
of warfare.
The point of the preceding discussion is not that every American
treaty of the era used "declare war" to include informal declarations of
war.1 9 6 Rather, the point is that many if not most treaties that used
the phrases "declare war," "declaration of war," and their analogs were
clearly premised on the understanding that one could declare war ei-
ther formally or informally. In other words, the vast majority of Amer-
ican treaties that referenced declarations of war regarded actions
193 See Letter from Franklin, Lee, and Adams to Sartine (Oct. 12, 1778), in 2 REVOLU-
TIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 13, at 779, 779.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 For instance, there were Indian treaties that used the formal definition. See Treaty
with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the Choctaws,
U.S.-Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the Chickasaws, U.S.-Chickasaw, Jan. 10,
1786, 7 Stat. 24.
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looking nothing like a formal declaration of war as declarations of war
nonetheless. 197
3. The Constitution's Creation
We have seen that in Europe and in America it was well under-
stood that waging a war was a declaration of war. Moreover, hostile
actions short of warfare were understood as declarations when they
signaled that a nation had decided to wage a war. Hence, a nation
might declare war by making a treaty with a warring nation or recal-
ling an ambassador. 198 While the Founders might have incorporated
the narrow, formalist understanding of declare war, the evidence indi-
cates that they incorporated the broader definition of declare war. As
discussed below, substantial founding era evidence supports the idea
that to start a war was to declare war. More importantly, there is much
support for the derivative proposition that Congress, and not the Pres-
ident, could decide whether the nation would wage war. Finally, there
is no evidence that anyone, either in Philadelphia or in the states,
read "declare war" in the Constitution as only authorizing Congress to
issue formal declarations of war.
When it comes to the genesis and meaning of "declare war,"
scholars and commentators have extensively examined the Philadel-
phia Convention.199 Nonetheless, there is more relevant evidence
here than many suppose. Most powerfully, James Madison observed
that the use of force against a "delinquent state ... would look more
like a declaration of war[ ] than an infliction of punishment."200 This
was Madison's way of denouncing the Articles of Confederation be-
cause it regulated the states as political entities rather than regulating
individuals. 20' In any event, Madison clearly understood that the use
of force could constitute a declaration of war. Less obvious, but no
less illuminating, was Alexander Hamilton's complaint that the Arti-
197 American treaties were not the only ones to embrace the categorical theory of "de-
clare war." A 1786 treaty between France and England was understood as providing that
the recall of an ambassador was a declaration of war. See Treaty of Navigation and Com-
merce Between His Britannic Majesty and the Most Christian King art II, Gt. Brit.-Fr., Sept.
26, 1786, in 1 GEORGE CHALMERS, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND
OTHER POWERS 517, 519 (London, 1790); see also THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
CHARLES JAMES Fox 498 (1853). The treaty itself did not expressly provide that the recall
would be a declaration of war but made it clear that the recall was equivalent to the com-
mencement of hostilities, which was itself a declaration of war. See Treaty of Navigation
and Commerce Between His Britannic Majesty and the Most Christian King art II, Gt. Brit.-
Fr., Sept. 26, 1786, supra, at 517, 519.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 117-29.
199 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 9, at 3-12; Yoo, supra note 3, at 256-69.
200 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 54 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
201 See generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (defining the rights of the states and their
relationships as states).
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cles of Confederation barred the states from having navies or armies
"before war is actually declared." 212 Hamilton thus equated peace-
time with the period before war was declared because the Articles'
prohibition only applied during peacetime.2 1" His equation only
makes sense given the established sense that waging war was itself a
declaration of war. Had Hamilton been using the formal, narrow defi-
nition of "declare war" his reading of the Articles would have been
quite mistaken because, as Hamilton clearly understood, wars were
typically fought without a formal declaration. 20 4
Of course, the famous change of language in Article I, section 8
from "make war" to "declare war" 20 5 was accompanied by comments
suggesting the President should not be able to start a war. James
Madison, Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman, and George Mason all op-
posed giving the President the power to wage a war, with only Pierce
Butler speaking in favor of the proposition. 2 16 But more interestingly,
scholars have overlooked a statement from Oliver Ellsworth tucked
away in that debate that "[w] ar... is a simple and overt declaration,"
while peace talks often require secrecy.2 17 Ellsworth could be read as
suggesting that warfare was itself a declaration of war.
Subsequent discussions suggest that delegates understood that
the grant of "declare war" authority meant that Congress could start a
war. In a discussion of the Senate majority necessary to secure a peace
treaty, Gouverneur Morris argued that the "Legislature will be unwill-
ing to make war" if peace treaties were hard to approve.2°8 He
thereby implied that Congress could decide whether the nation would
go to war. Another delegate argued that both chambers might re-
quire secrecy, as when "[m]easures preparatory to a declaration of
war" might be necessary. 20 9 This point was premised on the notion
that the declaration would commence the war and that secrecy would
be necessary until either warfare had begun or the other side had
been formally notified of the declaration. If declarations did not sig-
202 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 200, at 298.
203 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. VI ("No vessels of war shall be kept up in time
of peace by any state, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United
States, in Congress assembled, for the defense of such state, or its trade; nor shall any body
of forces be kept up by any state in time of peace, except such number only, as in the
judgement of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garri-
son the forts necessary for the defense of such state .... ").
204 See THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
205 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 200, at 318-19.
206 See id.
207 Id. at 319.
208 Id. at 548.
209 Id. at 613.
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nal a decision to wage war but were instead meant to trigger the appli-
cation of domestic statutes, secrecy would have been pointless.
Scholars likewise have combed through the ratification debates.
James Wilson's claim-that because Congress had the power to de-
clare war, no one man could involve the nation in a war-is well
known. 210 Slightly less well known are the comments of Pierce Butler
at the South Carolina ratifying convention. Butler, who in Philadel-
phia actually had sought to grant the President the power to make
war, noted that some delegates had opposed granting the President
the war power because it would grant him "the influence of a mon-
arch, having an opportunity of involving his country in a war."211
There are many other hitherto unknown statements pointing in
the same direction. In Massachusetts, Rufus King and Nathaniel
Gorham described the bicameralism and presentment needed to de-
clare war and claimed that "as war is not to be desired and always a
great calamity, by increasing the Checks, the measure will be diffi-
cult."2 12 Clearly, King and Gorham, two delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention, thought that America could not wage war unless Con-
gress first declared it. In New York, Robert Livingston talked of Con-
gress "enter(ing] into a war to protect the fisheries,"213 thereby
confirming that Congress would decide whether to go to war. Living-
ston was Chancellor of New York and had served as the Congress's
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 214 His reading of the Constitution was
thus the product of extensive legal and foreign affairs experience. In
North Carolina, James Iredell noted a "very material difference" be-
tween England and America in that the President could not declare
war.215 If the proposed Constitution had incorporated the formal
reading of "declare war," it would be impossible to describe it as em-
bodying a "very material difference" from its English counterpart on
210 See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787, at 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. Washington 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
211 4 id. at 263. In a private letter, Pierce Butler discussed the English's Crown's war
authority: The King "has the sole Right of declaring War or making Peace, so that the lives
of thousands of His Subjects are at His will." Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler
(May 5, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301, 302 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911). Butler thereby equated declaring war with actually fighting a war, a
conflation only possible if one adopts the broad definition of "declare war." Under the
narrow view, the entity that merely declares war is not the one who actually puts people's
lives in jeopardy.
212 See Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry's Objections, in
4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 186, 190 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997).
213 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 210, at 292.
214 Robert Livingston, ushistory.org, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/
livingston.r.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
215 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 210, at 107.
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this point. Iredell also said that the power of raising armies was neces-
sary during peace as well as after a declaration of war, 216 indicating
that the declaration of war itself was the dividing line between peace
and war. A declaration of war could not play this role if declarations,
either formal or informal, did not always mark the onset of war.
The Virginia ratification debates provide us with the largest vol-
ume of ratification material. George Nicholas noted that "[t]o make a
treaty to alienate any part of the United States, will amount to a decla-
ration of war against the inhabitants of the alienated part, and a gen-
eral absolution from allegiance." 21 7 Nicholas thereby embraced the
notion that hostile actions of various sorts might serve as a declaration
of war. Patrick Henry repeatedly equated declarations of war with en-
tering a war. After saying that republics do not enter wars without the
support of the entire community, Henry noted that in America the
Congress could both declare war and fund it. 2 18 He also said that
though the King could declare war, he would not enter into any un-
necessary war.2 19 Speaking of the hostile acts of outlaws and banditti,
Henry observed that "[t] hose who declare war against the human race
may be struck out of existence. ' 220 He thereby confirmed that one
can declare war by one's hostile actions or signals. James Madison
noted that if other nations declared war, Congress would need the
ability to raise and support an army.22' Madison's comments seemed
to endorse the categorical theory-had he been endorsing a more
narrow reading of "declare war" he would have been arguing that if
some other nation issued a formal declaration for internal purposes,
America would have to raise an army. Finally, John Marshall noted
that there was more security in America because Congress must de-
clare war, where the House of Commons had no such voice in En-
gland.22 2 He was evidently referring to the power to start a war and
not the power to make formal declarations. Marshall also emphasized
the need for secrecy in making declarations of war,223 a secrecy that
would be wholly unnecessary if all Congress could do was issue formal
declarations of war after warfare had already begun. Consistent with
his latter claims as Chief Justice, convention participant Marshall un-
derstood the power to declare war included the power to start a war, a
decision where secrecy would be quite useful.
216 See id. at 96.
217 3 id. at 362.
218 Id. at 172. George Mason and John Dawson made the same point. Id. at 379. Ma-
son in particular seemed to equate "declare war" with commencing a war. This reading is
consistent with his statements at Philadelphia.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 140.
221 See id. at 367.
222 Id. at 233. Governor Edmund Randolph made the same point. Id. at 201-02.
223 Id. at 231.
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Interestingly, delegates from Rhode Island and New York pro-
posed that Congress ought not be able to declare war unless two-
thirds of each chamber of Congress assented. 224 There would be no
need for this supermajority requirement if all that was at stake was a
decision to trigger the application of other statutes, as the formalist
theory supposes. The supermajority requirement was proposed pre-
cisely because delegates in Rhode Island and New York understood
that in declaring war, Congress would be deciding whether the nation
would wage war. These delegates evidently wished to make it more
difficult to go to war. Had they thought that the President could uni-
laterally choose to wage war, their proposal would have served no
purpose.
The Federalist Papers are replete with statements that support the
view that "declare war" referred to the commencement of warfare.
The strongest evidence comes from The Federalist No. 44. Under the
Articles of Confederation, the states could issue letters of marque and
reprisal only after a congressional "declaration of war."225 In contrast,
Madison noted that under the Constitution "these licenses must be
obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the
government of the United States."226 His point was that Congress con-
trolled these licenses at all times. Given the language he used, this
point could be conveyed only if he equated declarations of war with
the commencement of the war. In other words, Congress could issue
letters either before or after the beginning of a war. On the other
hand, if we assume that Madison was using the narrower, "formal"
reading of "declare war," we would have to regard him as asserting
that Congress would have the authority to issue letters only when the
nation was at war or when a declaration had been issued. This would
preclude Congress from issuing letters in times of peace. Given the
Constitution's clear allocation of unfettered authority to Congress to
issue such letters, 227 Madison must have used "declaration of war" in
the broad sense, i.e., to include decisions to wage a war.
Other Federalist Papers evinced the same understanding.
Madison's The Federalist No. 41 discussed the powers necessary for
"[s]ecurity against foreign danger."228 He listed the powers to declare
war, raise an army and navy, grant letters of marque and reprisal, raise
224 1 id. at 330, 336. Other states apparently proposed similar measures, particularly
Virginia and North Carolina. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at app., Note D, § 10 n.216
(St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803);JOURNALS OF
THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION, Arts. 9, 10.
225 THE FEDERALIsT No. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
226 Id.
227 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power to "grant letters of Marque
and Reprisal").
228 THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 40, at 256.
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taxes and borrow money.2 9 Had Madison been using the formal defi-
nition of "declare war," he would have left out one of the most impor-
tant powers necessary for "security against foreign danger"-the
power to decide to go to war. It seems fair to say that Madison's list of
powers was complete because Madison, as he would in The Federalist
No. 44, used "declare war" in the broad sense. 23t 0
Hamilton agreed with Madison. In The Federalist No. 69, Hamilton
twice repeated that the President, unlike the English Crown, could
not declare war.23 ' Hamilton never defined "declaring war," but his
meaning is clear from the context. Hamilton juxtaposed different au-
thorities to show that the President had far less authority than the
King. Hence, he compared the President's ability to control the Army
and Navy to the far greater authority that the Crown wielded. Had
Hamilton been using "declare war" in the formal sense, his compari-
son would have no persuasive force.
Finally, another hint comes from The Federalist No. 25, also Hamil-
ton's handiwork. Here Hamilton notes that the "formal denunciation
of war has of late fallen into disuse." 232 As discussed earlier, to speak
of "formal denunciation [s]" is to confirm that there is a category of
informal denunciations. As we have seen from Europe and America,
informal denunciations of war included the commencement of a war.
Moreover, The Federalist No. 25 colors the way other references to "de-
clare war" or "declaration of war" in The Federalist Papers ought to be
read. Understanding that Hamilton was well aware that countries
rarely issued formal declarations of war affects how we ought to read
all The Federalist references to the "declare war" power. It is unlikely
that either Hamilton or Madison would have discussed declaring war
as often as they did if it was a trivial, seldom used authority. Rather it
seems clear that both Hamilton and Madison used "declare war" in its
broad sense, to encompass decisions to wage war, whether made in a
formal or informal declaration.
The Constitution's drafting and ratification history reveals sub-
stantial evidence that delegates and pamphleteers read the Constitu-
229 Id.
230 In a similar way, THE FEDERALIST No. 18, apparently written jointly by Madison and
Hamilton, helps affirm the broad definition of "declare war." This paper described the
ancient Amphictyonic Council of Greece, a league of Greek states that set rules of interna-
tional conduct and settled disputes between these states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 18, at
122-23 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The authors
noted that the council had the power "to declare and carry on war." Id. Here, Hamilton
and Madison use "declare war" as a synonym for entering into a war. Otherwise, one would
have to read the sentence as referring to a power to issue formal declarations and a power
to fight once war had begun. However, the crucial power to wage war would have been
missing from the list of authorities.
231 THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 34, at 418, 422.
232 THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 204, at 165.
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tion as incorporating the categorical theory's definition of "declare
war." Furthermore, it appears that no delegate or pamphleteer ever
asserted either that the authority to declare war extended no further
than issuing formal declarations of war or that the Constitution au-
thorized the President to wage war absent a congressional declaration
of war.
4. The Constitution in the New Republic
This understanding of declare war and the Constitution's grant
of "declare war" power to Congress carried over to the New Republic.
As noted at the Article's outset, Ambassador Thomas Jefferson ob-
served that the Constitution had provided "one effectual check to the
Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the
Executive to the Legislative body."2 3 3 While serving as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Jefferson wrote that because the "Executive cannot
decide the question of war," Congress ought to be convened to answer
that question. 234 He also noted that the "Constitution... authorised
the legislature exclusively to declare whether the nation, from a state
of peace, shall go into that of war. '235 Later, he recommended that
Washington convene Congress because Congress would have to de-
clare war against the Creek Indians if the United States was to attack
them. 23 6 After leaving office, Jefferson complained that marching the
militia into a state was "declaring a civil war" whereas Congress had
the "sole right of declaring war."237
The Secretary of War shared the same understanding of "declare
war." Writing to Washington in 1790, Henry Knox described an En-
glish plan to march troops through American territory to attack
Spain.238 At the end of his letter, Knox suggested that Washington
233 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 1, at 397.
234 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 24, 1793), American Mem-
ory from the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mtj:@field(DOCID+@Iit(tj070089)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the "IMAGES"
hyperlink).
235 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 1, 1793), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 273, 274 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Put-
nam's Sons 1895).
236 Opinion on Convening Congress, Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Aug.
4, 1793), American Memory from the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(tj070197)) (for a scan of the original let-
ter, follow the "IMAGES" hyperlink).
237 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 28, 1794), American Mem-
ory from the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mtj: @field(DOCID+@lit(tj080075)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the "IMAGES"
hyperlink).
238 See Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Aug. 29, 1790), in 6 THE PA-
PERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 365, 365 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed.,
1996).
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place all the information before Congress. 239 This was prudent be-
cause Congress was "vested with the rights of providing for the com-
mon defence, and of declaring war," and hence "should possess the
information of all [relevant] facts and circumstances. '" 240 Knox pre-
mised his letter on the view that Washington could not order an attack
on the English troops until Congress had first declared war.
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton had no doubt that to
start a war was to declare it. Writing as Pacificus, he noted that "the
Legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the na-
tion from a state of peace to a state of hostility."24 t During the Jeffer-
son Administration, Hamilton affirmed the same:
[The Constitution] has only provided affirmatively, that, 'The Con-
gress shall have power to declare war'; the plain meaning of which
is, that it is the peculiar and exclusive province of Congress, when the
nation is at peace, to change that state into a state of war; whether
from calculations of policy or from provocations or injuries re-
ceived; in other words, it belongs to Congress only, to go to War.2 4 2
Hamilton's views are especially probative, given that some scholars re-
gard him as advancing overly expansive views of executive power. 243
His antagonist, Helvidius, agreed with Hamilton on this point.
Writing as Helvidius, James Madison argued that "[w] ar is in fact the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement." 244 Free states act to counter
this tendency by granting the power to declare war to the legisla-
ture.2 4 5 Moreover, Madison wrote that those who are to conduct a war
cannot be proper judges of "whether a war ought to be commenced, con-
tinued, or concluded."246 Madison was praising the grant of "declare
war" power to Congress and confirming that to start a war was to de-
clare it.
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, in his famous Lectures on
Law, adopted the view that "declare war" encompassed the power to
start a war. He praised America for having returned to the ancient
Anglo-Saxon constitution where the Wittenagemote, the early English
239 See id. at 367.
240 Id.
241 Letters of Pacificus, No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON 432, 443 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
242 No. 1, Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801, in 8
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 241, at 246, 249.
243 See, e.g., David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 155, 170-73 (2002).
244 Helvidius, No. 4 (Sept. 14, 1793), in JAMES MADISON'S "ADVICE TO My COUNTRY"
107, 107 (David B. Mattern ed., 1997).
245 See id.
246 Helvidius, No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), in JAMES MADISON'S "ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY",
supra note 244, at 107, 107.
2007]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
assembly, had the power to declare war.24 7 Wilson's claim in the Lec-
tures was consistent with his claim during the ratification fight.2 4 8
In Rights of Man, Thomas Paine criticized the English Constitu-
tion for permitting the Crown to declare war and granting the Parlia-
ment only an ex post appropriations check on warmaking. 249 Paine
argued that an ex post check was not as good as an ex ante safeguard:
[I]f the one rashly declares war as a matter of right, and the other
peremptorily withholds the supplies as a matter of right, the remedy
becomes as bad, or worse, than the disease. The one forces the nation
to a combat, and the other ties its hands; but the more probable issue
is that the contest will end in a collusion between the parties, and be
made a screen to both. 250
In the next paragraph, Paine said there are three questions when it
comes to war: the right to declare it, the right to fund it, and the right
to conduct it.25 1 He says the former two ought to be with the legisla-
ture and the latter ought to be with the executive. 2 52 Evidently, Paine
concurred with the general view that to wage war was to declare it.
What Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and others said about the
Constitution and the meaning of "declare war" was reaffirmed by con-
stitutional commentators Joseph Story, 253 William Rawle, 254 and St.
George Tucker. 255 Even British international law scholars had this un-
derstanding of the American Constitution. 256
Finally, one should note that all the evidence discussed in Part III
relating to response declarations of war likewise favors the notion that
the power to declare war includes the power to decide to go to war. 257
In particular, many in the founding era, including the first four Presi-
dents, believed that even after another nation had declared war
247 Justice James Wilson, On the Constitution of the United States and of Penn-
sylvania-of the Legislative Department, Lectures on Law Delivered in the College of Phil-
adelphia (1790-1791), in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 434-35 (Robert G.
McCloskey ed., 1967).
248 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
249 See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 39 (Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner ed., 1906)
(1791).
250 Id. (emphasis added).
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 See 2 STORY, supra note 38, at 96-98, 361.
254 See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 109 (Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 1829).
255 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at app., Note D, § 14-15.
256 Twlss, supra note 16, at 73 (noting that because only Congress could declare war, "a
war cannot be regularly commenced by the Federal Union without an Act of Congress").
257 See supra Part III.A. That evidence is discussed in Part III because it peculiarly re-
lates to the idea of response declarations of war. Yet if the power to declare war includes
the power to issue response declarations of war, it likewise must be the case that the "de-
clare war" power also includes the power to issue initiation declarations of war.
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against the United States, Congress still had to decide whether the
United States would wage war in response.2 58
To sum up, it appears that in the Constitution's early years, peo-
ple understood that the "declare war" power granted Congress the
authority to decide whether the nation would wage war. Furthermore,
no one in the early years ever asserted that Congress could issue only
formal declarations. Finally, no one maintained that the President
might start a war without a previous congressional declaration.
As we have seen, Europeans understood that the power to declare
war encompassed the power to decide to wage war. Hence, when na-
tions entered a war, they had declared war or issued a declaration of
war. The writings of historians and lawyers, as well as monarchs, min-
isters, and legislators contain this usage. This understanding of "de-
clare war" was also prevalent in America, as diplomatic writings and
treaties attest. Consistent with this definition, Americans read their
Constitution as incorporating the idea that only Congress could let
loose the dogs of war.
None of this denies that individuals might still use "declare war"
and "declaration of war" in the narrow sense of formally declaring
war. Even after a war began, there might still be comments to the
effect that a nation had not declared war yet. But none of these nar-
row uses of "declare war" deny the prevalence of the broader mean-
ing. The decision to use a phrase capable of multiple meanings in a
particularly narrow fashion in no way refutes the proposition that the
word in question also had a broader alternative meaning. Accord-
ingly, when individuals used "declare war" in its formal sense their
usage did not mean that they were rejecting the possibility that it had
a broader understanding that one might use in other sentences and
contexts. Indeed, people who used "declare war" in the narrow, for-
mal sense of that phrase in one instance also used the phrase to en-
compass all manner of informal declarations of war. 259
The key originalist question is what the Constitution meant when
it was ratified. Did the Constitution incorporate the narrow, formal
definition of "declare war" or the broader definition encompassing
the power to start a war? On every originalist level, the evidence fa-
vors the categorical theory. If one looks to the Framers, it is clear that
258 See discussion infra Parts lI.B.4, III.A.2.
259 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson (July 20, 1778), in 10
LETTERS OF DELEGATES ro CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 163, at 322, 322-23 (noting
that the "Court of France consider the Message of the King of England to his Parliament
and their answer.., as a denunciation of War on the part of G. Britain, and that they mean
to Act accordingly, without an express declaration, leaving this last to England").
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they regarded the power to "declare war" as encompassing the power
to start a war. The same is true of the Ratifiers-they too believed the
Constitution granted Congress the power to start a war. If we look for
the original public meaning, public usage in Europe and America
confirms that to enter into a war was to declare it. Finally, if we look
to those who implemented the Constitution in its early years, we see a
consensus that only Congress could take the nation from peace into
war. While a constitution surely could incorporate the narrow, formal
definition of "declare war," there is no evidence that the federal Con-
stitution did or that anyone regarded it as so doing.
III
THE RESPONSE DECLARATION OF WAR
When another nation declares war on the United States, there is
the question of how to respond. Is the decision to wage war in these
circumstances, however expressed, itself a declaration of war? If so,
who may issue this response declaration of war? This Part considers
these two questions, concluding that Congress may issue response dec-
larations of war and that only Congress may decide whether the na-
tion will wage war after another nation declares war.
A. Text, History, and Response Declarations
The textual argument is simple but worth reviewing lest we forget
first principles. Given that the Constitution grants "declare war" au-
thority to Congress and never grants the President that power, only
Congress can declare war. Hence, whatever constitutes a declaration
of war must be issued by Congress, if at all. If the power to declare war
includes the power to issue a response declaration, then only Con-
gress may issue response declarations of war. The only question left to
be answered is whether, historically, the power to issue response decla-
rations of war was part and parcel of the general power to issue decla-
rations of war.
Evidence from the eighteenth century indicates an affirmative an-
swer. While response declarations might assume different forms-
sometimes they were formal documents, more often they were infor-
mal statements, documents, or actions-European nations issued re-
sponse declarations of war and regarded these response declarations
as issued pursuant to the power to declare war.2 60 Consistent with this
understanding, Americans regarded their Constitution as granting to
Congress the right to decide when the nation wouid adopt offensive
measures, i.e., go to war.26 1 When another nation declared war, for-
260 See infra Part III.A.1.
261 See infra Part III.A.2.
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mally or informally, Presidents did not regard themselves as constitu-
tionally authorized to take offensive measures. Instead, Presidents
believed that the Constitution authorized them to order defensive
measures only. Their inability to order offensive measures against
other nations stemmed from the grant of "declare war" power to Con-
gress. Early Presidents understood that had they ordered offensive
measures, they would have informally declared war.
1. European Understandings
Europeans recognized that the power to declare war included the
power to issue response declarations of war. After England declared
war against Spain in the mid-eighteenth century, Spain issued a for-
mal declaration of war of its own. 262 Likewise, Republican France for-
mally declared war on Britain in 1793, arguing that Britain had
informally declared war.263 In response, Britain declared war against
France. 26 4 More generally, European history provides numerous ex-
amples of formal response declarations of war.265
Informal declarations offer even more evidence that the power to
declare war encompassed the power to issue response declarations.
That is to say, nations were repeatedly seen as informally declaring
war in response to another nation's declaration of war. For instance,
after France informally declared war on England during the Revolu-
tionary War, England was said to have informally declared war against
France in the Crown's message to the Parliament, in the Parliament's
response, and in the hostilities that England committed against
France. 266 Similarly, Russia and Sweden declared war against each
other via actual warfare. 267 And, of course, there are many statements
recognizing that hostilities are the most common and obvious declara-
tion of war, 2 6 statements which do not merely refer to the initial ag-
gressor's hostilities as a declaration. The simple point is that when a
nation decides to wage war in response to another country's declara-
tion of war, that nation necessarily has declared war, either formally or
informally.
Admiral Horatio Nelson's dealings with Neapolitan generals per-
haps best reveals that "declare war" encompassed the response func-
262 See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
263 Decree Which Declares that the French Republic is at War with the King of En-
gland and the Stadtholder of the United Provinces, in A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES, supra
note 111, at 157, 161.
264 1 W. H. Fitchett, How ENGLAND SAVED EUROPE 37 (1900).
265 See Prakash, supra note t, at 209 n.73 (citing more wars).
266 See Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams, supra note 13, at 48.
267 See THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE,
FOR THE YEAR 1788, supra note 107, at 75-76.
268 See, e.g., 1 NECKER, supra note 14, at 273; Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams,
supra note 13, at 48.
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tion. Nelson was exasperated because these generals refused to seize
French vessels, claiming that their King had not yet declared war.269
Nelson's view of the matter bears quoting in full:
I have been thinking all night of the General and Duke of Sangro's
saying, that the King of Naples had not declared war against the
French. Now, I assert that he has, and in a much stronger manner
than the ablest minister in Europe could write a declaration of war.
Has not the King received, as a conquest made by him, the Republi-
can flag taken at Gozo? Is not the King's flag flying there and at
Malta . . .? Is not the flag shot at every day by the French, and
returned from batteries bearing the King's flag? [Neapolitan ships
would] fight the French meet them where they may .... If those
acts are not tantamount to any written paper, I give up all knowl-
edge of what is war.2 70
Nelson's discussion clearly reflects the understanding that all parties
waging war necessarily declare war. He did not try to determine who
declared war first and then say that only that nation had declared war.
His arguments only made sense precisely because he understood that
a nation might informally declare war against another, even after war
had previously been declared on it.
Similarly, that the Neapolitan generals were reluctant to wage war
indicated that they too understood that their King had to issue a re-
sponse declaration of war (of some sort) if they were to fight a war. If
response declarations of war served no purpose, these generals ought
not to have questioned whether their King had declared war; they
ought to have fought the French without hesitation. These generals
understood that their King had other options besides waging war, and
hence they wondered whether he had decided to wage war. Nelson's
description of the warfare reveals his belief that the King had chosen
to wage war and had therefore declared it.
2. American Understandings
The United States has its own experiences with the response dec-
laration of war. Its first formal declaration of war, the declaration
against England in 1812, was a response declaration of war.27 1 In that
war, Congress regarded America as the victim of unprovoked war-
269 See MAURICE, supra note 90, at 32-33.
270 Id. (final alteration in original). Nelson was not alone in concluding that the
Neapolitans had declared war. See id. at 32.
271 Act of June 18, 1812, 3 Stat. 755 (stating that "war is ... hereby declared to exist,"
indicating that England had started the war prior to America engaging in war). See also
Special Message to Congress (June 1, 1812), in 8 THE WPITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 192,
199-200 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908) (Madison noting that England was already in a state of
war with the United States).
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fare. 2 72 Nonetheless, no one thought that the President could unilat-
erally decide that the nation would fight England. Instead, President
James Madison went to Congress and sought a declaration of war. He
realized that he could not declare war and hence could not decide
whether the nation would wage war.2 73
This understanding of the "declare war" power did not originate
with the War of 1812. Despite the many formal and informal declara-
tions of war against America in its early years, every President before
James Madison likewise understood that if the nation was to go to war,
the Congress would have to authorize as much. There were three
components of this shared understanding. First, because only Con-
gress could declare war, only Congress could authorize offensive mea-
sures against other countries. Second, if Congress chose to authorize
limited offensive actions against a foe, those were the only offensive
measures permitted. Third, whatever Congress might do, the Presi-
dent was constitutionally empowered to adopt defensive measures
meant to protect American lives, property, and territory so long as
such measures did not amount to an informal declaration of war.
Practice in the Washington Administration is especially illuminat-
ing.2 7 4 The Creeks had declared war against the United States in the
spring of 1793.275 Writing to South Carolina Governor William Moul-
trie in the summer of that year, President Washington noted that he
hoped to launch an "offensive expedition against the refractory part
of the Creek Nation, whenever Congress should decide that such mea-
sure be proper and necessary. The Constitution vests the power of
declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of im-
portance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated
upon the subject, and authorized such a measure." 27 6 Washington
272 See Act of June 18, 1812, 3 Stat. 755; see also REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, TO WHOM WAS REFERRED THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, OF THE 1ST OF JUNE, 1812, in OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL OF-
FICERS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN IN THE YEARS 1812, 13,
14, & 15, at 15, 20 (John Brannan ed., D.C., Way & Gideon 1823) (noting that England
had declared war through her hostilities).
273 See infta text accompanying footnotes 326-33 (discussing Madison's request for au-
thority to fight England).
274 Many, but not all, of these episodes were first recounted in Abraham Sofaer's mas-
terful work on war and foreign affairs in the early republic. See ABEAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 122-24 (1976).
275 Extract of a letter from Andrew Pickens, Esquire, to General Clarke (Apr. 28,
1793), in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 369, 369 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St.
Clair Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1834).
276 Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), American
Memory from the Library of Congress, http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw330067)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the
"IMAGES" hyperlink).
2007]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
recognized that if the nation was to use more than defensive measures
against the Creeks, Congress would have to authorize as much.
Washington's 1793 State of the Union address revealed the same
line between defense and offense. In his message, he simultaneously
noted that troops had taken offensive measures against the Wabash
Indians north of the Ohio River and that "offensive measures" were
prohibited against the Creeks and the Cherokees during the recess of
Congress. 277 Washington concluded that it was for "Congress to pro-
nounce what shall be done" with respect to the latter Indians. 278 Why
did Washington order offensive measures against the Wabash but bar
such measures against other tribes? Because Washington had con-
cluded that Congress had informally sanctioned such measures
against the Wabash 279 but had not authorized war against any other
tribes.
Washington's cabinet agreed that he lacked the constitutional au-
thority to order offensive measures, even in the face of a declaration
of war. In 1792, Governor William Blount of the Tennessee territory
had written to War Secretary Knox, informing him that several Chero-
kee tribes had "declared war" against the United States. Knox wrote a
letter to the President stating that the Governor should be instructed
that "all measures of an offensive nature be restrained until the meet-
ing of Congress, to whom belong the powers of war."280 Knox re-
ported that this was the unanimous opinion of the Secretary of
State, Thomas Jefferson, and the Treasury Secretary, Alexander
Hamilton.281
In his reply to Blount, Knox observed that until Congress passed
judgment on the matter "it seems essential to confine all your opera-
tions to defensive measures-This is (intended) to restrain any expe-
dition against the Indian Towns-but all incursive parties against your
frontiers are to be punished with the greatest severity."282 These limi-
tations were necessary because Congress "possess [es] the power[ ] of
declaring war. '283 In separate letters to nearby governors, Knox simi-
277 See Fifth Annual Message of George Washington to the Congress (Dec. 3, 1793),
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/sou/
washs05.htm.
278 Id.
279 See SOFAER, supra note 274, at 122-24. Sofaer also notes that further reasons the
government did not take additional offensive actions were that these actions "may have
been regarded as too dangerous" and Washington was concerned that state governments
would be unfair and excessively brutal. Id. at 124.
280 Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Oct. 9, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 238, at 212, 212.
281 See id.
282 Letter from Henry Knox to William Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 238, at 212, 213 n.3 (containing
quoted excerpts of that letter).
283 Id.
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larly explained that though defensive measures were fine, offensive
measures were forbidden until Congress approved because only Con-
gress had the war power. 28 4 Thus, even though Cherokee tribes had
declared war against the United States, Knox and the cabinet did not
think that Washington unilaterally could choose to wage war against
them.
Recognizing that his constitutional authority was limited, Wash-
ington sought authority from Congress to conduct offensive measures
against the Indian tribes. Before he sent a message to Congress, he
apparently asked Jefferson to draft a message for him. Consistent with
his earlier opinion,Jefferson wrote that "[t]he Question of War, being
placed by the Constitution with the legislature alone . . . made it my
[i.e., Washington's] duty to restrain the operations of our militia to
those merely defensive." 285 Washington's actual message noted that
militia had been used to repel Indian invasions, as provided by statute
and that Congress would have to approve any further measures. 28 6 He
closed by noting that the "future conduct of the Executive will ...
materially depend" on Congress's decision. 287 Washington accompa-
nied this message with the letter from Governor Blount about the
Cherokee declaring war. 2z8
Congress apparently agreed with Washington that it had the
power decide whether to authorize offensive measures. While Con-
gress implicitly authorized offensive operations against the Wabash In-
dians,289 on other occasions it rejected provisions that authorized
offensive expeditions against the Indian nations that had declared
war.290 Congress's refusal to authorize additional wars suggests that
284 See Letter from the Secretary of War to the Governor of Virginia (Oct. 9, 1792), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 261, 261; Letter from the Secre-
tary of War to the Governor of South Carolina (Oct. 27, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PA-
PERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 262, 262; Letter from the Secretary of War to the
Governor of Georgia (Oct. 27, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 275, at 262.
285 Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Message on Southern Indians (Dec. 7, 1792), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 235, at 144, 144.
286 Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives (Dec. 7,
1792), 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 740 (1849).
287 Id.
288 See id. Washington was quite consistent in his views about the "declare war" power.
During the Adams Administration, Hamilton broached the idea of invading Louisiana and
the Floridas with Washington. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASi-WAR: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at 122 (1966). Wash-
ington, however, "opposed all offensive operations against Spanish territory without a dec-
laration of war." Id.
289 See SOFAER, supra note 274, at 122-23.
290 Id. at 123; see also id. at 412 n.292 (citing votes and debates in Annals of Congress
where Congress refused authority for offensive expeditions against the Indians).
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members perhaps thought that one Indian war was all that the United
States ought to wage. 2
9 1
The Washington Administration realized that the congressional
refusal to authorize offensive expeditions against warring Indians on
the southern frontier meant that they could use only defensive mea-
sures against such Indians. For instance, in a 1793 letter to the Vir-
ginia Governor, Washington noted that his Administration's "hands
are tied to defensive measures."29 2 The Administration's hands were
tied to defensive measures because Congress had failed to approve
offensive measures. Likewise, consider the response to Georgia Gov-
ernor Edward Telfair's 1793 request for permission to conduct an of-
fensive expedition against the Creeks. Secretary Knox wrote back on
behalf of the President, saying that the President "utterly disapproves
the measure at this time."293 The first reason was that "an expedition
is unauthorized by law. The right of declaring war, and making provi-
sion for its support, belong to Congress. No such declaration has
been made against the Creeks, and, until this shall be done, all offen-
sive expeditions against their towns will be unlawful."294
Finally, there is a parallel letter written by Secretary Knox to Gov-
ernor Blount in 1794. Blount apparently sought approval for laying
waste to certain Cherokee towns.295 Knox wrote back that, however
useful such destruction might be, "I am instructed, specially, by the
291 See id. at 123-24. A letter written by Jefferson supports this potential explanation.
Jefferson wrote that the United States finds "an Indian war too serious a thing to risk."
Letter from ThomasJefferson to David Campbell (Mar. 27, 1792), American Memory from
the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@field
(DOCID+@lit(tj060218)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the "IMAGES" hyper-
link). Instead, he advised that "it will ever be preferred to send an armed force and make
war against the intruders as being more just & less expensive." Id. Jefferson apparently
meant that Congress preferred to fend off invaders rather than taking the fight to the
enemy. By not authorizing offensive measures against the Indians in the southwest fron-
tier, Congress limited the President to his constitutional power of defending United States
territory.
292 Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee (May 6, 1793), American Memory
from the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@
field(DOCID+@lit(gw320345)) (for a scan of the original letter, follow the "IMAGES"
hyperlink).
293 Letter from Henry Knox to William Telfair (Sept. 5, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 365, 365. Knox did suggest that it might be
permissible to engage in what one might call "hot pursuit" of retreating invaders. See id.
("[C]ases may exist to render a pursuit of Indians who have been invading the frontiers,
into their own country without a formal declaration of war .... ).
294 Id. In subsequent letters, Knox noted that an offensive expedition against the
Creeks would be "unauthorized by law." See Letter from the Secretary of War to James
Seagrove, temporary agent to the Creek Nation (Sept. 16, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 366, 367; Statement to the President (Dec. 16,
1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 361, 362 (same).
295 See Letter from Henry Knox to William Blount (July 26, 1794), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275, at 634, 634-35.
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President, to say, that he does not conceive himself authorized to di-
rect any such measure, more especially, as the whole subject was
before the last session of Congress, who did not think it proper to
authorize or direct offensive operations. '" 296 Writing of these events in
1798, Secretary of War James McHenry noted that Washington had
consistently limited the measures in the southwestern frontier to "de-
fensive operations" only and had refrained "from those which were
offensive.""2 9 7
So, notwithstanding two declarations of war, one by the Creek
and one by the Cherokee, Washington and his cabinet believed that
the Constitution limited him to defensive measures; he could not or-
der offensive expeditions merely because of their declarations of war.
Moreover, in rejecting language that would have authorized offensive
expeditions, Congress seemed to agree. This conception of presiden-
tial and congressional authority arose from a shared understanding of
the Declare War Clause. Because only Congress could declare war,
only Congress could decide whether war was appropriate against na-
tions that had already declared war. Absent such a congressional dec-
laration, the President was limited to authorizing defensive measures,
i.e., measures not rising to the level of a declared war.
John Adams understood that hostilities were themselves declara-
tions of war, having said as much during the Revolutionary War.29j 8 As
noted earlier, he described both France and England as declaring war
through their hostilities and did not distinguish the first declarer from
the second. 299 Adams thus recognized that once one nation declared
war on another, the victim still had to decide whether to declare war
in kind. The mere fact that one nation had declared war in some
manner did not mean that the victim necessarily had to fight the war.
President Adams stayed true to this understanding during the un-
declared war with France. Even before Adams assumed office in early
1797, France had been waging war against American shipping. By
June of that year, French vessels had captured some 316 American
ships over the course of a year.3°0 Little wonder that in mid-1797,
Adams felt that France was already "at war" with the United States.3 ° 1
296 Id. In a later letter to Blount, written after Blount had authorized the offensive
expedition, McHenry said the "subject of the Southwestern frontiers is before Congress.
Whatever they direct, will be executed by the Executive." Letter from Henry Knox to Wil-
liam Blount (Dec. 29, 1794), in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 275,
at 634-35.
297 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1523 (1851).
298 See supra notes 13, 178 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
30o 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 57-61 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St.
Clair Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832) (listing 316 ships).
301 See DECONDE, supra note 288, at 23.
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In April 1798, Congress authorized the purchase of ships to de-
fend American shipping from French predations.30 2 The question
was what orders naval commanders should receive. War Secretary
James McHenry sought advice from Hamilton as to what Adams ought
to do. Confining himself to construing Adams's constitutional author-
ity, Hamilton stated,
I am not ready to say that [the President] has any other power than
merely to employ the Ships as Convoys with authority to repel force
by force, (but not to capture), and to repress hostilities within our
waters including a marine league from our coasts. Any thing be-
yond this must fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanc-
tion of that Department which is to declare or make war.
30 3
Hamilton understood that only Congress could authorize the
capture of French vessels and that only Congress could authorize the
Navy to make war on French shipping generally. So even though
Hamilton believed that France was waging war against the United
States,3°14 he concluded that the President could do nothing more
than repel French ships and suppress French hostilities within our ter-
ritorial waters. Hamilton apparently did not believe that the Constitu-
tion authorized Adams to wage war against a nation already waging
war on the United States. Hamilton's advice about the President's
constitutional powers was consistent with the opinion that Knox had
earlier ascribed to Hamilton regarding the proper executive response
to the Cherokee declaration of war.3 0 5
McHenry conveyed this advice to Adams. 30 6 Adams apparently
agreed with it as he issued narrow instructions to a captain in the
Navy. 30 7 After first reciting Congress's powers to declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal and make rules concerning captures,
Adams noted that the captain's operations must be "partial and lim-
ited. ' 30 8 Adams authorized defensive measures and did not permit
the general capture of French ships or other offensive operations.
30 9
As noted earlier, Adams held this narrow view of his constitutional
302 See Act of Apr. 27, 1798, 1 Stat. 552, 552 (obsolete).
303 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), in 21 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461, 461-62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
304 See Americus, The Warning, in 6 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 241, at
229, 243.
305 As we shall see later, Hamilton did not stay true to this reading of the "declare war"
power. See infta notes 334-51 and accompanying text.
306 See SOFAER, supra note 274, at 155.
307 See id. at 156.
308 See id.
309 See id.
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authority even though he believed that France already was at war with
the United States..3"1
Congress would subsequently declare a limited war, granting nar-
row authority to capture French vessels and constrained authority to
attack French military vessels. 3 1' This authorization suggests that
members of Congress grasped that the President could neither wage a
limited war nor escalate and wage a general war. All that President
Adams could do was dictate defensive measures of the type he had
already ordered. Had members of Congress thought that Adams
could order offensive measures, they would have declined to pass leg-
islation authorizing the limited naval warfare and instead would have
told Adams to rely upon his own powers.
Adams regarded Congress's legislation as a declaration of war.
Writing to Secretary of State John Marshall in 1800, Adams explained
that "Congress has already, in my judgment, as well as in the opinion
of the judges at Philadelphia ... declared war within the meaning of
the Constitution against [France] under certain restrictions and limi-
tations."3 12 Summing up, Adams thought France was waging war, con-
cluded that he could not order the Navy to wage war in response, and
described congressional legislation as a declaration of war. Hence,
Adams clearly believed that only Congress would decide whether war
was appropriate, even in the face of France's naval war. Moreover, by
describing congressional legislation as a declaration of war, Adams
confirmed the view that only Congress could issue response declara-
tions of war.
As President, Thomas Jefferson acted consistently with the re-
peated advice he gave Washington and the path Adams trod. In 1801,
Tripoli declared war against the United States.3 13 American ships had
been sent to the region and had captured a Tripolitan cruiser.3 1 4 Af-
ter disabling the Tripolitan ship, the American forces released it and
its crew.31 5 Jefferson thought that no other measures were appropri-
ate because offensive measures were left to Congress's discretion:
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Con-
gress, to go beyond the line of defence, the vessel, being disabled
from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The
310 See DECONDE, supra note 288, at 23; see also I Op. Arr'Y GEN. 84 (1798) (reflecting
the opinion of Charles Lee that the French were waging an "actual maritime war"); 1 NA-
VAL DocUMENTs RELATED TO THE QUASI WAR WITH FRANCE 194, 204, 452, 454, 501 (Navy
Secretary repeatedly noting that United States was at war with French armed vessels only).
311 SeeAct of May 28, 1798, 1 Stat. 561, 561 (obsolete); Act ofJune 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565,
565-66 (expired); Non-Intercourse Act, 1 Stat. 613, 613 (expired).
312 DECONDE, supra note 288, at 281-82.
-1.- See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 11 (1851).
314 See id.
315 See id.
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Legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing mea-
sures of offence also, they will place our force on an equal footing
with that of its adversaries.
"3 1 6
Jefferson evidently thought that the Constitution barred him from tak-
ing offensive actions that would amount to declaring war.3 17
Congress concurred. In December of 1801, Congress considered,
as one Representative put it, whether the President "shall be empow-
ered to take offensive steps."3 1 8 Congress made it lawful for the Presi-
dent to use the Navy to capture Tripolitan ships and goods and to take
any other "acts of precaution or hostility."31 9 Had Congress disagreed
with Jefferson's view of his own authority-had members believed that
the Constitution itself authorized the President to order full warfare
against Tripoli-most of the informal declaration of war would have
been wholly superfluous.
On a number of other occasions, Jefferson expressed similar sen-
timents. After the British vessel Leopard attacked the Chesapeake, an
American naval vessel, 320 Jefferson noted in a letter that "[w]hether
the outrage is a proper cause of war, belonging exclusively to Con-
gress, it is our duty not to commit them by doing anything which
would have to be retracted."32 1 In the face of Spanish possession of
the disputed West Florida, Jefferson argued that he could not author-
316 Id. It should be noted that certain members ofJefferson's cabinet, in advice previ-
ously given to him, disagreed with Jefferson's claim that the President needed congres-
sional authority to order offensive measures against a nation that already had declared war.
See infra note 334.
317 Sofaer argues thatJefferson's speech to Congress was less than candid because or-
ders to an American commodore authorized the general destruction of Tripolitan ships.
See SOFAER, supra note 274, at 210-13. Moreover, Jefferson lamented that other ships were
not captured. See id. at 210. But the question is why Jefferson failed to reveal that the
orders permitted the destruction of enemy ships. In this case, it seems that his dissembling
stemmed from a desire to appear a scrupulous observer of the Constitution's limits on his
authority. Jefferson said that disarming the ship was all that could be done because he
thought that anything more would intrude upon congressional prerogatives. In other
words, the best explanation for why Jefferson hid the truth is that Jefferson understood
that the actual orders to naval officers were or might have been constitutionally suspect.
Sofaer also points out that Jefferson was not consistent in opposing congressionally
unauthorized captures. When a naval captain had seized a Moroccan ship guilty of captur-
ing an American brig, Jefferson praised the captain in messages to Congress. See id. at
223-24. To be sure, Jefferson never intimated that the captain had unconstitutionally ven-
tured beyond the line of defense. Id. YetJefferson did say it was for Congress to "consider
the provisional authorities which may be necessary to restrain" Morocco, suggesting that,
once again, Jefferson believed that Congress would have to authorize offensive warfare. See
id. at 224.
318 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 327 (1851) (comments of Representative Eustis).
319 Act of Feb. 6, 1802, 2 Stat. 129, 130 § 2 (obsolete).
320 See SOFAER, supra note 274, at 198.
321 Id. at 199 n.t. In another letter, Jefferson observed "[t]hat the power of declaring
war being with the Legislature, the executive should do nothing, necessarily committing
them to decide for war in preference of non-intercourse." Id.
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ize "offensive" force but could order defensive measures. 322 He also
told Congress that because it "alone is constitutionally invested with
the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have
thought it my duty to await their authority for using force in any de-
gree which could be avoided."3 23
Finally, as noted at the outset, James Madison shared the view
that only Congress could decide whether to wage war against a nation
that waged war against the United States. In his 1812 message to Con-
gress that preceded America's formal declaration of war, Madison re-
counted a host of indignities meant to show that Britain was waging
war against the United States. 324 He cited impressments, blockades,
and other measures as evidence that Great Britain was in a state of war
with the United States.3 25 At the end of his message, Madison noted
that whether the United States would "continue passive" or "oppos[e]
force to force in defense of their national rights" was a "solemn ques-
tion which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative depart-
ment of the Government. '" 326 Plainly, Madison believed that it was for
Congress to decide whether to declare war even in a situation where
Great Britain was waging war (albeit a limited one) against the United
States.
Once again, Congress agreed with this categorical reading of "de-
clare war." A committee report had noted that "it would be superflu-
ous... to state, that.., the British government [has] declared direct
and positive war against the United States." 327 Yet rather than inform-
ing Madison that he was mistaken and that the President could wage
war at will because England had already informally declared war, Con-
gress famously enacted a formal declaration of war, which "author-
ized" the President "to use the whole land and naval force of the
United States to carry the [declaration] into effect." 328 Such a decla-
ration would have been wholly unnecessary had the informal British
declaration of war been sufficient for the President to take America
into a war.
322 Id. at 200.
323 Id. at 200 n.* (quoting 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 19).
324 See Special Message to Congress (June 1, 1812), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 192, 199-200 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TO WhOM WAS REFERRED THE MES-
SAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OF THE 1ST OFJUNE, 1812, supra note 272, at
20. The committee report referred to a British order in council from 1807 that "consum-
mated" a system of hostility on American commerce. Id. at 19.
328 Act of June 24, 1812, 2 Stat. 755 (obsolete) (declaring War between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United
States of America and their territories).
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The Algerian war teaches the same lessons. In 1812, the Algeri-
ans declared war against the United States. 329 When the war with En-
gland ended, Madison went to Congress in 1815 complaining of
Algerian "acts of more overt and direct warfare against the citizens of
the United States trading in the Mediterranean." 33 0 He recom-
mended that Congress pass "an act declaring the existence of a state
of war between the United States" and Algeria and "such provisions as
may be requisite for a vigorous prosecution" of the war.33 t Within
days, Congress enacted a statute permitting the President to employ
the Navy to protect commerce near Algeria and permitting him to
instruct naval commanders to capture Algerian vessels and to take
"all . . .other acts of precaution or hostility, as the state of war will
justify. ' 332
These events parallel those that led to the declaration of war
against England. They once again show that President Madison did
not believe that he could wage war merely because another nation
had declared war and was waging war against the United States. 333
Moreover, the episode confirms that Congress understood that only it
had the power to determine whether to wage war (i.e., authorize of-
fensive measures) against Algeria.
That Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison (and many of
their assistants) were of the view that they could not take actions that
would amount to a response declaration of war is powerful evidence
that early Americans regarded such declarations as committed to con-
gressional discretion. These Presidents arguably had the incentive to
voice readings that maximized executive power and minimized the
import of the "declare war" power. Yet each adopted self-abnegatory
readings of "declare war." Each confirmed that the President could
not take actions that would amount to a response declaration of war
because the power to declare war was committed to Congress in toto.
It also bears repeating that Congress agreed with the presidential
endorsement of the categorical theory of declarations. Congress
329 2 THEODORE LYMAN,JR., THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES 369 (2d ed., Boston,
Wells and Lilly 1828).
330 Confidential Message of the President to the House and Senate (Feb. 23, 1815), in
9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 783, 783 (D.C., Gales & Seaton 1815).
331 Id.
332 Act of Mar. 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 230 (obsolete).
3-3'3 A decade after Madison left office, he wrote a letter to James Monroe in which he
claimed that the President can "enter on a war" when a "state of war has 'been actually'
produced by the conduct of another power." Letter from James Madison to Mr. Monroe,
in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 599, 600 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1867). As evidence, he cited the "war with Tripoli" during Jefferson's administration.
Id. Yet Madison also stated that "it ought to be made known as soon as possible to the
Department charged with the war power," suggesting perhaps that Congress might still
have to declare war or authorize more limited hostilities. Id.
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never told Washington, or any of his successors, that the Constitution
granted the President the right to wage war as soon as another nation
declared war against the United States. Instead, members of Congress
realized that they could decide whether something more than defen-
sive measures were necessary. Congress sometimes declined to do an-
ything, as with the Creeks and Cherokee, leaving the Executive to
continue implementing a purely defensive strategy in the face of their
warfare.
On other occasions, Congress authorized warfare after other na-
tions began a war against the United States. Indeed, in the declara-
tions of war against England, Tripoli, and Algeria, Congress laid the
onus for starting the war on these other countries. By authorizing the
President to fight those wars, Congress thereby confirmed that even
when another nation declares war against the United States, only Con-
gress may decide whether the United States would wage war in
response.
B. Arguments Against the Idea of Response Declarations
Those inclined to resist the categorical theory of "declare war"
might respond with a number of arguments. First, one might argue
that once another nation had created a state of war through its decla-
ration, it was impossible, given conventional understandings of "de-
clare war," for the victim nation to respond with a declaration of its
own. Alexander Hamilton could be read as arguing as much when he
mocked Jefferson's claim that Congress would have to approve offen-
sive measures against the Tripolitans. 334 An English judicial opinion's
claim that "[a] declaration of war by one country only is not . .. a
mere challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other"335
perhaps points to the same conclusion. Second, one might contend
that customary international law did not require a nation that was at-
334 See Lucius Crassus, The Examination No. 1, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1801, re-
printed in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 303, at 444, 455-56.
Hamilton was not alone in the view that when another nation declared war on the
United States, no congressional response declaration was necessary. Jefferson wrote of a
cabinet meeting in which most of the cabinet believed that he could order U.S. ships to
search for and destroy Tripolitan cruisers. See Entry of May 15, 1801, in THE COMPLETE
ANAS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 213, 213 (Franklin B. Sawvel ed., 1903). The lone dissenter was
Jefferson's Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, who argued American vessels could repulse an
attack but could not destroy the attackers. Id. Madison apparently registered a partial
dissent: although Jefferson listed Madison as agreeing thatJefferson could order American
captains to search and destroy the enemy, Madison also said that American vessels could
not go into Tripoli's harbors, unless in pursuit of an enemy vessel. See id. Perhaps Madison
thought that going after Tripolitan ships in harbors was too close to an offensive measure
and hence would amount to a declaration of war. For a slightly more fulsome discussion,
see SOFAER, supra note 274, at 209.
335 The "Eliza Ann", (1813), 165 Eng. Rep. 1298, 1299-300, 1 Dodson 244, 247
(Adm.).
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tacked to respond with a declaration of war. Under this view, because
international law did not require declarations of war, the President
did not need to wait for Congress to issue a declaration. Instead, he
could immediately wage war in response to another nation's declara-
tion against the United States. Third, one might admit that although
a nation could issue response declarations, the phrase "declare war"
somehow encompassed fewer functions in the response context. In
particular, if a nation did nothing more than wage war in response to
a declaration, its war making would not itself constitute a declaration
of war.
The first argument defies history. As discussed in the previous
subpart, response declarations were quite common. When another
nation declared war, the victim nation might respond by trying to sue
for peace and the like. But if the victim nation decided to wage war,
this decision, however made or expressed, was the victim's declaration
of war. There is no historical warrant for supposing that a nation
could not "declare war" on its enemy after its enemy had declared war
on it.
While Alexander Hamilton may have argued otherwise, his claims
do not withstand scrutiny. Writing as Lucius Crassus, Hamilton ridi-
culed Jefferson's request for congressional authority to fight the Tri-
politans, arguing that it was "impossible to conceive the idea, that one
nation can be in full war with another, and this other not in the same
state with respect to its adversary. 336 If both nations were in a state of
war, he argued, there was no need to declare war. 337 Hence, there was
no need for Jefferson to go to Congress because he could prosecute
the war as he saw fit.
The problems with this argument are legion. To begin with, it
rests on an easily contestable claim about when a nation was at war.
One might say that every nation that is attacked is ipso facto in a state
of war, as Hamilton insisted. But one might just as easily say that the
nation attacked is not in a state of war until it decides to wage war
against the aggressor. The proper way to characterize this situation is
not obvious. For instance, consider a nation of Quakers. When at-
tacked by an aggressor, the Quaker nation might not resist out of re-
spect for its principles. As far as this nation is concerned, it is not in a
state of war. And outsiders may agree that while the aggressor is at
war with the Quakers, the Quakers are not at war.
Interestingly enough, Presidents John Adams and James Madison
voiced the exact distinction that Crassus wholly disparaged. Adams
observed that France "is at war with us, but we are not at war with
336 Lucius Crassus, The Examination No. 1, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1801, reprinted in
25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 303, at 444, 455-56.
337 See id.
[Vol. 93:45
UNLEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR
her."'I"8 In his war message of 1812, Madison said much the same
thing: "We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war
against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state
of peace toward Great Britain. 3 "1 Neither Adams nor Madison be-
lieved that because the aggressor nation was in a state of war it fol-
lowed that the victim was in the same state. The victim had to decide
whether to wage war in response.
Even more interesting, in the midst of France's naval war against
American shipping, Hamilton voiced the distinction he would later
mock. Writing as Americus, Hamilton claimed that France's policy of
attacking American ships was "war of the worst kind, war on one
side."'3 4 Writing as Titus Manlius, he noted that while France was wag-
ing war on the United States, some Americans were doing the utmost
to avoid war with France. 341 Each of these statements adopts the view
that though France was at war against the United States, the latter was
not at war with the former.
In any event, if one accepted Crassus's claim that a nation at-
tacked is necessarily in a state of war, one can still challenge his as-
sumption that the state of war matters for purposes of discerning what
a nation's armed forces may do in this state of war. The questions of
who may order the use of force and what kinds of force they may
authorize are questions that have nothing to do with whether one is in
a state of war or not. They are questions about a nation's internal
constitutional structure. Hence, Crassus's insistence that the United
States was in a state of war was irrelevant. Crassus himself admitted
this when he observed that a constitution may limit the use of force
even when a nation was in a state of war.342 His subsequent claim that
the Constitution did not do this was utterly conclusory.
As evidence that Lucius Crassus was wrong on the constitutional
point, one could not only cite Presidents and Congresses, one also
could cite Hamilton and his previous alter ego, Pacificus. Recall Ham-
ilton's views about presidential power in the wake of the Cherokee
declaration of war. Hamilton concurred in War Secretary Knox's
opinion that Congress would have to approve any offensive measures
against the Cherokees because only Congress could declare war.343
Moreover, recall his advice to War Secretary McHenry during France's
-338 DECONDE, supra note 288, at 23.
339 See Special Message to Congress (June 1, 1812), supra note 324, at 199-200.
340 Americus, The Warning, in 6 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 241, at
229, 243.
341 Titus Manlius, The Stand, N.Y. CoM. ADVERTISER, Mar. 10, 1798, reprinted in 6 WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 241, at 259, 263, 265.
342 See Lucius Crassus, The Examination No. 1, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1801, re-
printed in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 303, at 444, 455.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
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undeclared war against U.S. shipping.344 Even though Hamilton
thought that France was waging war on the United States, Hamilton
was sure that Adams could not order captures, much less plunge the
United States into a general war. Finally, Pacificus wrote that "the
Legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation
from a state of peace to a state of hostility."345 This statement denies that
any other nation can place America in a state of war and affirms that
only Congress can accomplish as much. Ironically, Crassus mocked
Jefferson for defending a vision of limited presidential power that
Hamilton had endorsed on numerous occasions.
In discussing the Tripolitan affair, Crassus wholly missed the im-
port of earlier difficulties with the Barbary nations. Rather than fight
a war declared by the Barbary States, America previously thought it
better to pay tribute to them. 346 He also ignored the import of the
congressional decision to not wage war against the Cherokee and
Creek and Washington's respect for that choice. 347 These earlier epi-
sodes furnish an effective refutation of Hamilton's narrow reading of
"declare war." Once one concludes that a nation can do something
besides waging war, it becomes quite obvious that the decision to de-
clare war in response to another nation's previous declaration is an
important and often difficult one. While trying to score points against
Jefferson, Hamilton insisted that the decision rested with the Presi-
dent. The Constitution's grant of "declare war" power to Congress
indicates otherwise.
The second argument-one that contends that response declara-
tions were not required under international law-makes an irrelevant
(albeit interesting) point without ever calling into question the princi-
pal meaning of "declare war." Certain international law theorists
maintained that a nation attacked did not need to issue a declaration
of war in response. As Emmerich de Vattel wrote, "[h]e who is at-
tacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to make any hostile
declaration,-the state of warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the
enemy's declaration or open hostilities." 348 Christian Wolff similarly
claimed that a declaration "is superfluous for the party waging the
344 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
345 Letters of Pacificus No. 1, supra note 241, at 432, 443 (emphasis added).
346 See FRANK LAIMBERT, THE BARBARY WARS 49-78 (2005) (describing how America
paid tribute to the Barbary powers).
347 See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
348 VATrEL, supra note 145, at 317. Vattel, properly understood, denies that a declara-
tion is needed only in the context of a purely defensive war. His writings indicate that
when one wishes to provide for one's safety by punishing an aggressor or to recover terri-
tory or property, one is no longer waging a defensive war. See id. at 302-03. When one is
pursuing one of those ends, Vattel's exception no longer applies, and he argued that a
formal declaration was required.
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defensive war."' 349 Because the victim of aggression "necessarily wages
defensive war ... it certainly seems incongruous to announce to an-
other that we intend to do what we cannot omit without neglect of
duty, nor without injury to our citizens. '13 50 Speaking of the Tripolitan
war, Crassus confirmed that international practice established that a
nation did not have to declare war once another nation had declared
war against it.35
1
Read in context, the statements from Vattel and Wolff clearly re-
lated to whether a nation had to issue a formal declaration of war in
response to a declaration of war.352 Indeed, the focus of international
lawyers was always on the formal declaration. These theorists were
merely saying that as a matter of international law, a victim of aggres-
sion did not need to give notice of its intention to respond with war-
fare. This was an eminently sensible principle.
Yet the real question is not whether, as a matter of international
law, the United States had to formally declare war upon Great Britain
after Great Britain already had declared war against the United States.
Instead, the relevant question is whether one could sensibly say that a
nation upon whom war was declared could in turn declare war on its
avowed enemy. The reasonable principle that a formal declaration
was unnecessary in this context is wholly irrelevant to this question.
A moment's reflection makes the answer to the relevant question
obvious. Of course it was possible for a nation to respond with a dec-
laration of war of its own. One does not need to recount the many
historical incidents proving as much, for the statements of the interna-
tional law scholars themselves supply the proof. In asking whether a
nation had to declare war after being the victim of a declaration of
war, the scholars made it rather clear that a nation could declare war.
If a nation could not declare war in these circumstances-because the
phrase "declare war" was not used in these circumstances-then there
would have been no occasion to inquire whether a declaration of war
was required.
If it was possible to have response declarations of war and if the
power to declare war was the power to decide to go to war, then an
entity with the "declare war" power had to decide whether to fight a
349 2 WOLFF, supra note 146, § 713, at 368.
350 Id.
351 See Lucius Crassus, The Examination No. 1, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1801, re-
printed in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 303, at 444, 456.
352 Whether Crassus's point was so limited is unclear. If Crassus was only speaking of
formal declarations of war, he obviously was correct. If, however, Crassus was referring to
declarations of war generally, he was clearly wrong. The evidence is clear that the decision
to go to war was itself a declaration of war, even when made in response to another na-
tion's declaration of war. Accordingly, if Crassus was speaking of both formal and informal
declarations of war, practice actually refuted his claim.
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war, even after another nation declared war. Within our constitu-
tional regime, the grant of the power to declare war to Congress
means that only Congress can decide to wage war, whatever the cir-
cumstances. The President is limited to those measures that do not
constitute a declaration of war.
The last argument against the idea that the power to declare war
includes the power to issue response declarations fares no better. Re-
call that this argument supposes that "declare war" in the response
context encompasses some of the functions normally associated with
declaring war but excludes the function of deciding whether to wage a
war. It seems implausible to suppose that "declare war" had some
more limited meaning in one isolated context. Indeed, there is no
good reason to think that "declare war" meant something broad in
the context of starting a war but something far narrower in the con-
text of a war already declared by an aggressor. This is a little like
saying that the power to raise taxes means one thing in times of
budget surplus and another thing in times of deficit. In any event,
historical evidence discussed in the previous subpart coheres with the
intuition that when two nations fight a war, both the aggressor and the
victim thereby "declare war." In contrast, there is no evidence sup-
porting the speculative assertion that "declare war" had a narrower
compass in the response context.
Ultimately, none of the objections to the notion of response dec-
larations of war bears any scrutiny. Given the grant of "declare war"
power to Congress, Congress must determine whether offensive mea-
sures are the appropriate response to another nation's declaration of
war. The President cannot usurp this decision by waging a full-scale
war in response to an informal or formal declaration of war. Instead,
the President can do no more than take those defensive measures that
do not constitute an informal declaration of war.
IV
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE ORIGINAL. MEANING OF
"DECLARE WAR"
If one accepts the claim that to wage war was to declare war, what
implications and difficulties follow? This Part begins by briefly high-
lighting some surprising implications arising from the definition of
"declare war" advanced here. Next, it addresses the difficulties in de-
ternining what military measures the President may order, consistent
with Congress's "declare war" power. Finally, it considers whether the
Constitution's method of going to war is outdated.
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A. Implications of the Categorical Theory
The original meaning of "declare war" gives rise to a number of
interesting implications for how to discuss declarations and warfare.
The first such implication is that every American war was a declared
war, at least in the constitutional sense. It has been a common com-
plaint that America has fought many so-called undeclared wars. The
examples are familiar: Korea, Vietnam, etc. Some might add the two
Iraq wars and the Afghan conflict to this list. If we use the original
meaning of "declare war" as a guide, however, the United States has
never fought an undeclared war because that is logically impossible.
Whenever the United States started a war, it necessarily declared war
either formally or informally. Likewise, whenever the United States
decided to enter a war started by another nation, that decision was
itself a declaration of war.
This does not mean that all such wars were constitutionally de-
clared. The complaints against America's undeclared wars should
perhaps be restated as complaints that Presidents usurped the author-
ity of the constitutional organ enjoying the sole power to declare war.
In other words, the claim should not be that Presidents have fought
undeclared wars, but that Presidents have declared war when only Con-
gress ought to have done so. Whether these complaints have merit
turns on whether, during the relevant periods, Congress passed mea-
sures that served as informal declarations of war.
A second implication is that even though the Constitution sup-
poses all wars are declared, it is still possible to say that a warring na-
tion has not declared war. When someone observes that a warring
nation has not declared war, they typically mean no more than that
the nation has not yet issued a formal declaration of war. Or perhaps
they are complaining that the warring nation gave no formal warning
that they were about to attack. Either way, such observations do not
call into question the broad understanding of "declare war" found in
the Constitution. That a warring nation has not issued a formal decla-
ration of war does not mean that it has not issued an informal declara-
tion of war.
Indeed, it is possible for the same person to say that a nation has
declared war in the informal sense and has not declared war in the
formal sense. During the Revolutionary War, some said that both En-
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gland353 and France 354 had declared war but had not formally de-
clared war. This was not a sign of some mental confusion. Rather
speakers were using "declare war" in two different senses.
The claim that the "declare war" power included the power to
issue informal declarations of war might seem to generate an odd re-
sult. In particular, a nation might be regarded as having informally
declared war and yet never actually wage war. For example, should a
nation in the eighteenth century dismiss an ambassador in a hostile
manner, that nation could be said to have declared war. But warfare
might never ensue, making this something of a phony declaration. 355
Although this oddity might seem something peculiar to the broad
definition, it is in fact possible with respect to the narrow, formal defi-
nition of "declare war" as well. Under the formal definition, a nation
might unconditionally declare war and yet never actually commence
warfare. Why might this happen? The declarant nation might have a
change of heart; the declarant might have been bluffing, hoping to
coerce the other nation; the other nation might have successfully paci-
fied the declarant; and other nations might have intervened to stave
off warfare.
In one way, the possibility of a declared war without actual hostili-
ties is more acute once one accepts that a nation can declare war in-
formally because many more actions might be mistaken for
declarations of war when no such declaration was intended. In an-
other way, however, the possibility of a phony war is eliminated in the
case where actual offensive warfare constitutes the declaration of war.
Unlike a formal declaration which leaves open the possibility of no
ensuing warfare, an informal declaration of war that occurs via war-
fare leaves no gap between intent and reality. When offensive warfare
constitutes the declaration, there is no chance of a false declaration of
war. In any event, the fact that there might be more non-wars after
some kinds of informal declarations does not call into question the
category of informal declarations. Just as a formal declaration of war
353 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson (July 20, 1778), in 10 LET-
TERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 163, at 322, 322-23 (noting that
the "Court of France consider the Message of the King of England to his Parliament and
their answer ... as a denunciation of War on the part of G. Britain, and that they mean to
Act accordingly, without an express declaration, leaving this last to England.").
354 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee, supra note 163, at
266-67 (noting that a French Count had declared war on board his fleet but also noting
that there had been no formal declaration of war).
355 There was something of a phony war in 1775, or so a member of Parliament ar-
gued. Speaking before the House of Commons in early 1775, the member argued that
America and England were both in an "open and declared war" but that no blood had yet
been spilt. See House of Commons, American Archives, Documents of the American
Revolution, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/projects/artflb/
databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.1850 (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) (comments of
Governour Pownall). As we know, actual warfare eventually did break out.
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is a declaration of war regardless of whether warfare ensues, informal
declarations of war are no less declarations of war even if no warfare
actually results. Because, historically, declaring war was merely a deci-
sion to wage war, it always was possible that a nation making such a
decision might have second thoughts prior to actually waging war.
B. Difficulties Associated with the Categorical Theory
The grant of "declare war" authority to Congress reflects a princi-
ple that the President should not embroil the nation in a war. Deci-
sions about whether to resort to warfare rest with Congress. The
primary difficulty with implementing this principle lies in discerning
which statements and actions are forbidden to the President because
they constitute declarations of war. The following discussion consid-
ers this question while generally refraining from offering definitive
answers.
Although the President has executive power to communicate with
foreign nations and can say all manner of things to them,356 the exclu-
sive grant of "declare war" power to Congress makes it clear that there
are some things that the President cannot utter. Under any theory of
the meaning of "declare war," the President cannot make speeches or
issue announcements, the substance of which would amount to a dec-
laration of war. The President, acting alone, certainly cannot say "I
declare war" against another nation. Moreover, acting alone, the Pres-
ident cannot threaten the resort to warfare should another nation not
comply with certain demands. A demand that a nation do something
on pain of war is a conditional declaration of war. Only Congress can
make a conditional declaration of war.3 57
The greater difficulty lies not with statements but with actions. As
we have seen, the Constitution uses "declare war" to encompass all
actions that signal a war's onset. It is easy enough to say that the Com-
mander in Chief cannot start a war or join one without some congres-
sional declaration. Implementing that principle is far more difficult
and raises thorny questions.
In discerning what actions are forbidden to the President, should
we be governed by the generic principle reflected in the Declare War
Clause or by the specific actions that would have been regarded as
declarations of war in the eighteenth century? The general principle
356 See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (arguing that the President has executive power to
communicate with foreign nations and wide latitude in what to say).
357 The President could still threaten to lobby Congress to declare war should another
nation not comply with the President's admonitions and demands. But this threat will be
less worrisome precisely because the President cannot wage war without first getting Con-
gress to authorize the warfare.
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is that Congress must decide whether the nation is to wage war. While
nations generally regarded making a treaty of alliance with a warring
party as a declaration of war in the late eighteenth century,358 the
question is whether we should continue to regard such treaties as dec-
larations of war today even if no existing government continues to
regard such treaty making as an informal declaration of war. On the
other hand, there may be actions that nations did not regard as decla-
rations of war in the eighteenth century that the modern world would
generally regard as such today.359 This poses a difficult, if familiar,
question of how to make sense of ancient constitutional text that ap-
pears to enshrine concepts whose content may change over time.
Similar questions arise in discerning the original meaning of the ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.
A related question is what to make of a situation where a foreign
nation warns that it will regard certain U.S. actions as a declaration of
war. As we have seen, nations sometimes warned that they would re-
gard seemingly innocuous statements or actions as declarations of
war.3 60 The better view is that such threats are really attempts to shift
blame for the start of a war. If the President takes the action the op-
posing nation warned against, the President has not declared war in
the constitutional sense, for another nation cannot make some action
a declaration of war merely because it announces its eager willingness
to treat it as such. Of course, should the other nation declare war in
response to the supposed declaration of war by the United States, the
Congress would face the question of whether the nation would wage
war in response.
Another issue concerns how to understand "declare war" when
powers committed to other actors might enable them to declare war
through their actions. For instance, if the making of treaties of alli-
ance with warring parties was (and is) a declaration of war, one might
doubt whether the President and Senate could make such a treaty.361
Another question relates to actions that the President might take uni-
laterally that might constitute declarations of war, such as the dismis-
358 See NEFF, supra note 28, at 109.
359 This possibility-that there might be new actions that constitute informal declara-
tions of war-seems less likely given that many seem to be unaware of the possibility of
informal declarations of war.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
361 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur ... ."). Washington's second Attorney General, William Bradford, apparently doubted
that the Executive could, via treaty, commit the United States to wage war. He observed
that such a question "would perhaps come more properly before that body in whom the
right of declaring war is vested." Letter from William Bradford to Edmund Randolph (July
5, 1794), http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/105/1100/1142.jpg & http://mem-
ory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/105/1100/1143.jpg.
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sal of foreign ambassadors. Of course, such questions about the
interaction of powers arise all the time, as when scholars discuss
whether the treaty power can legislate upon subject matters commit-
ted to Congress, like the taxing power. 36 2
Perhaps the most vexing issue is the extent to which the President
can order the use of military force without that use constituting a dec-
laration of war. Without attempting to provide a definitive treatment,
a few comments seem in order. First, it is clear that nations did not
view all uses of force as declarations of war. Although one commenta-
tor remarked that "hostilities are commonly considered as the strong-
est declaration of war,"363 no one ever claimed that all hostile actions
were regarded as declarations of war.
For instance, consider a wayward cannonball shot across a na-
tion's frontier by mistake. No one would say that the nation from
whence the cannonball came had thereby declared war, for a nation
cannot accidentally declare war. Likewise, consider a renegade
French captain who attacked English naval ships. If France disclaimed
the attack and offered restitution, the captain's actions could not
properly be attributed to France. This would mean that France had
not declared war through the actions of its renegade captain. Fur-
thermore, any English ships that might attack the French ship in self-
defense would not thereby have declared war against France. Neither
the attack nor the vigorous defense would amount to a declaration of
war because neither nation actually sought to immerse itself in a war.
Early American history indicates that the President might order
the armed forces to defend themselves against attack without such or-
ders themselves constituting a declaration of war. Delegates at the
Philadelphia Convention recognized that not all uses of force consti-
tuted declarations of war. Without being contradicted by their com-
rades, some delegates said the President could repel "sudden attacks"
without running afoul of Congress's authority to declare war.364 Simi-
larly, Washington and his aides noted that governors could take de-
fensive measures to thwart Indian raids because such measures did
not constitute a declaration of war. 3 65 Jefferson drew the same line
with respect to Tripoli. Even Hamilton agreed with this general divi-
sion, at least until Jefferson voiced it to Congress.3 66 What unites the
errant cannonball, the actions of a renegade captain, and those
soldiers who defend themselves and their nation's territory is that
362 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959 (1999) (discussing the compli-
cated interaction between the treaty power and Congress's legislative powers).
363 1 NECKER, supra note 14, at 273.
364 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 200, at 318.
365 See supra notes 274-97 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 280-81, 303 and accompanying text.
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each of these actions in no way resembles a decision to wage war. A
nation's armed forces can be quite lethal without ever informally de-
claring war.
On the other hand, a decision to "take the fight to the enemy"
and indiscriminately attack that nation's ports, territory, etc., would
constitute a declaration of war. That is so because any such decision
would be a decision to wage war and, as such, a declaration of war.
That is why Washington, Jefferson, Knox, and even Hamilton argued
that the President alone could not order offensive measures against
those that had declared war against the United States.
We might profitably draw upon the criminal law concept of self-
defense. Under the generic concept of self-defense, someone at-
tacked may respond with proportional force to ward off or disable the
attacker. A person must use no more force than appears reasonably
necessary in the circumstances. When the danger has passed, the per-
son seeking to use the self-defense argument cannot continue to pur-
sue the original aggressor on grounds of self-defense, for at this point
the victim becomes the aggressor.
In the same way, we might say that a nation has not declared war
when it responds to an attack with defensive measures designed to
thwart the attack. It may destroy the advancing enemy and may take
prisoners. None of these measures would be viewed as a declaration
of war. But if the victim nation creates a new front or decides to at-
tack the aggressor after the aggressor has withdrawn, then the victim
has itself declared war. While such actions may well be justified under
principles of international law or under conceptions of morality, those
matters are not in dispute. The inquiry is whether creating a new
front or pursuing aggressors long after they have retreated would con-
stitute a declaration of war. Materials from the eighteenth century
suggest that the answer is "yes."
Accordingly, in response to hostilities initiated by another nation,
the President is limited to a lethal but calibrated defensive response,
reserving to Congress the decision whether to wage an offensive war.
This fuzzy dividing line leaves much up in the air. But this is hardly
something peculiar to the categorical theory of "declare war." Any the-
ory that hopes to explain what it means to "declare war" will have to
explain what actions constitute "war" and why certain actions fall short
of being termed "war." Of more relevance, any theory that accepts
that certain acts of hostilities rise to the level of a declaration of war
will have to explain which acts of hostilities by other nations amount
to an informal declaration of war. This inquiry somewhat mirrors the
questions that scholars might ask of the President's ability to order the
use of force short of an informal declaration. Hence, any plausible
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theory about "declare war" will face the problem of blurry lines in a
world where many prefer distinct, easily discernible ones.
The fact that there will be difficult questions about what military
measures the President can order in response to an attack does noth-
ing to call into question the idea that certain uses of force constituted
a declaration of war. The existence of difficult cases cannot alter the
eighteenth-century consensus that countries could (and did) issue re-
sponse declarations of war and that waging war was a response decla-
ration of war.
C. Is the Constitution's Mechanism for Going to War Outdated?
Some will no doubt applaud the constitutional scheme outlined
here. For various reasons, they will prefer a regime where Congress,
rather than the President, must decide whether and how the nation
will wage war. Others will have a very different reaction, condemning
this system for going to war as unworkable, impractical, and down-
right harmful to the nation's interests.
Without wading too much into what is, at its heart, a policy dis-
pute over the desirability of a constitutional provision and its implica-
tions, a few comments seem appropriate. There is much to be said
against the constitutional scheme outlined here. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that members of Congress are not always attuned to the inter-
national interests of the United States and are far more obsessed with
local matters. And handcuffing the President's ability to use force will
predictably make it more difficult for the United States to use force
effectively and to threaten the use of force to achieve desirable objec-
tives. Writing over two centuries ago, Frenchman Jacques Necker la-
mented that France had handicapped itself by requiring that all
declarations be made by the Assembly when other nations could de-
clare war by simply attacking. 367 Moreover, he noted that there could
be no secret attacks if the debate about whether to declare war was
conducted in an assembly. 68 The same complaints apply to the U.S.
Constitution.
Because these are policy objections, they properly belong in a dis-
cussion about whether we ought to follow the Constitution's original
meaning or depart from it in the face of harmful consequences. It is
no fatal objection to the categorical theory of "declare war" that some
might think that it leads to a suboptimal constitutional scheme, espe-
cially when there are many who would contest that negative assess-
ment. In any event, even if there were some contemporary consensus
that the constitutional scheme for going to war was downright dread-
367 See I NECKER, supra note 14, at 271.
368 Id.
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ful, we should hardly be surprised by this negative consensus. We
ought to expect that what many may have regarded as optimal in the
eighteenth century might be regarded by many as quite detrimental in
our very different twenty-first century. Evidence of this phenomenon
is to be found in the regular rejection of the Constitution's original
meanings on the ground that they generate ruinous constitutional
rules.369 Why should the original meaning of the Declare War Clause
be any different?
CONCLUSION
In one sense, the eighteenth-century categorical meaning of "de-
clare war" has become obscured. Today, many scholars and ordinary
Americans think of a declaration of war as a formal document that
promises war against another nation or that proclaims that a state of
war already exists. Anything else is not a declaration of war. This ac-
counts for the common view that the nation has declared war so few
times over its long history. This also accounts for the notion that even
when Congress has expressly called for war, it has not declared war.
In another sense, however, the eighteenth-century meaning of
"declare war" is alive and well. People sometimes speak of a nation
declaring war through hostile acts. For instance, some have called
Israel's 2006 incursions into Lebanon a "declaration of war"370 even
though Israel never issued a formal declaration of war.-3 7' For
whatever reason, however, this broader sense of "declare war" gener-
ally is shunted aside when people discuss the Constitution. Politicians,
scholars, and ordinary citizens are inordinately fixated on formal dec-
larations of war.
This Article has demonstrated that in the eighteenth century all
sorts of hostile statements and actions were seen as declarations of
war. Individuals not only regarded the actual commencement of war-
fare as the strongest declaration of war; they also viewed other less
hostile actions as declarations. Hence, individuals understood as dec-
larations of war the recall or dismissal of ambassadors, the cutting
down of another nation's flag, the grant of general letters of reprisal,
369 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005) (arguing that the Constitution, as originally un-
derstood, leads to horrible results, such as permitting segregation and allowing restraints
on all manner of speech, and using these results as the principle reason for rejecting
originalism). For a critique of Sunstein's consequentialist theory of interpretation, see
Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Law Professors are Wrong
for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006).
370 SeeJoshua Partlow & Saad Sarhan, Attacks Target Worshipers at Iraqi Mosques, WASH.
POST, July 15, 2006, at A14.
371 See Dan Izenberg, High Court Rejects Beilin's Petition to Declare War, JERUSALEM POST,
Aug. 3, 2006, at 7.
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and the making of a treaty of alliance with a warring nation. These
signals were regarded as declarations of war because they evinced a
resort to warfare to settle differences.
All this still leaves open the difficult question of what to do with
this more accurate and comprehensive sense of the original meaning
of "declare war." There are those originalists who seem intent on em-
phasizing recent patterns of presidential war making either as a means
of casting doubt on the original meaning claimed here or as a means
of minimizing the continued relevance of that original meaning. And
there are those non-originalists who condemn recent practice as an
aberration and maintain a steadfast, if awkward, fidelity to original
meanings only in the narrow context of the "declare war" power.372
The claims made here about the original meaning of "declare war"
may serve to perpetuate this odd and somewhat comical role reversal.
372 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 172 (pointing out for the first time this role reversal).
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